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Abstract
This paper introduces generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), a logic for epistemic reasoning based on
possibility theory. Formulas in GPL correspond to propositional combinations of assertions such
as “it is certain to degree λ that the propositional formula α is true”. As its name suggests, the
logic generalizes possibilistic logic (PL), which at the syntactic level only allows conjunctions of
the aforementioned type of assertions. At the semantic level, PL can only encode sets of epistemic
states encompassed by a single least informed one, whereas GPL can encode any set of epistemic
states. This feature makes GPL particularly suitable for reasoning about what an agent knows
about the beliefs of another agent, e.g., allowing the former to draw conclusions about what the
other agent does not know. We introduce an axiomatization for GPL and show its soundness and
completeness w.r.t. possibilistic semantics. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness of GPL as
a powerful unifying framework for various knowledge representation formalisms. Among others,
we show how comparative uncertainty and ignorance can be modelled in GPL. We also exhibit a
close connection between GPL and various existing formalisms, including possibilistic logic with
partially ordered formulas, a logic of conditional assertions in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and
Magidor, answer set programming and a fragment of the logic of minimal belief and negation as
failure. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of reasoning in GPL, identifying decision
problems at the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Keywords: Possibilistic logic, Epistemic reasoning, Non-monotonic reasoning
1. Introduction
Possibilistic logic [1] (PL) is a logic for reasoning with uncertain propositional formulas.
Formulas in PL take the form (α, λ) where α is a propositional formula and λ is a certainty
degree taken from the unit interval, or from another linear scale. Contrary to probabilistic
logics, possibilistic logic models accepted beliefs in the sense that if two propositions are
believed to a certain level, so is their conjunction. In many applications, a PL knowledge
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base encodes the epistemic state of an agent. We then assume that all the agent knows are the
formulas contained in the knowledge base and their logical consequences, with the weights
referring to the degree of epistemic entrenchment [2] or the strength of belief. However, in
its standard form, possibilistic logic has limitations as a tool for epistemic reasoning, i.e.,
reasoning about uncertainty, in at least two respects.
First, given that a knowledge base encodes a single epistemic state, PL does not allow
us to encode incomplete information about the epistemic state of an agent. For example,
assume that this agent privately ﬂips a coin and looks at the result without revealing it. Then
either the agent knows that the result was tails, which could be encoded as {(tails, 1)}, where
1 indicates complete certainty, or the agent knows that the result was heads, which could
be encoded as {(¬tails, 1)}. However, all an outside agent knows is that one of these two
situations holds, and in particular this other agent knows that the ﬁrst agent is not ignorant
about the outcome of the coin ﬂip. To express this situation in PL, we would need to write
a disjunction (tails, 1) ∨ (¬tails, 1) which is not allowed in the language. In this paper, we
propose a generalized possibilistic logic (GPL) in which such disjunctions can be expressed.
This brings PL syntax closer to the one of modal logics for epistemic reasoning, and, to
emphasize this, we will use a slightly diﬀerent notation and write N1(tails) ∨ N1(¬tails)
instead.
Second, PL does not allow us to explicitly encode information about the absence of
knowledge. Instead, in practice, we must rely on a kind of closed-world assumption, i.e.,
assume that the agent does not know whether α is true if neither α nor its negation can be
derived from the given knowledge base representing what is known about this agent’s beliefs.
When reasoning about beliefs as revealed by an agent, this assumption is hard to keep and
we need to distinguish between situations where we (the outside agent) know that the agent
is ignorant about α and situations where we do not know whether the agent knows α or
not. In GPL, this can be achieved by putting a negation in front of PL formulas: ¬N1(α)
expresses that we know that the agent does not believe in the truth of α,1 whereas situations
where we have no such knowledge are encoded by GPL theories which have models in which
N1(α) is true and models in which N1(α) is false.
GPL is closely related to modal logics for epistemic reasoning such as KD45 and S5.
However, it is essentially a two-tiered propositional logic, and, instead of using Kripke frames,
the semantics we propose for GPL is based on possibility distributions, which explicitly
represent epistemic states. Our ability to directly interpret the modality N as a constraint
on a necessity measure results from the fact that we do not allow the modality N to be
nested. Furthermore, by not allowing objective formulas, we can naturally interpret each
GPL formula as a constraint on the possible epistemic states (i.e., possibility distributions) of
an agent. Compared to existing epistemic modal logics [3], we thus trade some expressiveness
for a more intuitive way of capturing revealed beliefs. Among others, the use of possibility
distributions has the advantage that (strength of) belief can be naturally encoded as a
graded notion and that existing concepts from possibility theory such as minimal speciﬁcity
and guaranteed possibility can be exploited to model ignorance in a natural way. This will
1It means the agent either believes its negation or ignores the truth status of α.
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enable us to encode various forms of non-monotonic reasoning in GPL. For instance, we will
show how GPL can be used to model the semantics of answer set programming [4] (ASP)
without relying on a ﬁxpoint construction, unlike most existing characterizations of ASP,
and how default rules in the sense of System P [5] can be modelled by taking advantage of
the fact that GPL can express comparative uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we recall some basic notions from possibility
theory and possibilitistic logic. In Section 3 we deﬁne the language of GPL and a corre-
sponding semantics in terms of possibility distributions. We then provide an axiomatization
which is sound and complete w.r.t. this latter semantics. In Section 4 we analyze how GPL
can be used to reason about the ignorance of another agent, focusing on the role of minimal
speciﬁcity and an extension to the language of GPL related to the notion of “only knowing”
[6]. In Section 5 we then focus on the ability of GPL to model comparative uncertainty (e.g.,
α is more certain than β), showing how GPL can be used to encode a variant of possibilistic
logic with partially ordered formulas [7], and how, as a result, a conditional logic based on
System P [5] can be embedded in GPL. Subsequently, in Section 6 we explain in more detail
how GPL relates to a number of existing formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning that are
based on the notion of negation as failure. Section 7 discusses a number of computational
issues, including the complexity of the main reasoning tasks. We also propose a reduction to
SAT, allowing for a straightforward implementation of the reasoning tasks at the ﬁrst level
of the polynomial hierarchy. Finally, we present our conclusions.
This paper aggregates and signiﬁcantly extends parts of [8] and [9]. In particular, in [8]
we introduced the syntax, semantics and axiomatization of GPL, whereas in [9] we studied
methods for modelling ignorance in GPL, introduced a new proof of the completeness of the
axiomatization, and discussed some of the complexity results from Section 7. The results in
Sections 5 and 6 are entirely new (although the encodings in Section 6 are similar in spirit
to the encoding of equilibrium logic in [8]).
2. Preliminaries from possibility theory
Consider a variable X which has an unknown value from some ﬁnite universe U . In
possibility theory [10, 11, 12], available knowledge about the value of X is encoded as a
mapping π : U → [0, 1], which is called a possibility distribution. The intended interpretation
of π(u) = 1 is that X = u is fully compatible with all available information, while π(u) = 0
means thatX = u can be excluded based on available information. Note that the special case
where we have no information about X is encoded using the vacuous possibility distribution,
deﬁned as π(u) = 1 for all u ∈ U . Usually, we require that π(u) = 1 for some u ∈ U , which
corresponds to the assumption that the available information is consistent. If the possibility
distribution π satisﬁes this condition, it is called normalized.
In general, the value of π(u) can be interpreted in terms of degrees of potential surprise:
the smaller the value of π(u), the more we would be surprised to ﬁnd out that X = u. This
interpretation goes back to Shackle [13] and supports a purely qualitative interpretation
of the possibility degrees π(u). In such a case, we could replace the unit interval [0, 1] by
another linear scale (although an involutive order-reversing mapping is also needed). Other
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interpretations of possibility degrees relate a possibility distribution to a family of probability
distributions [14], to a family of likelihood functions [15], to Shafer belief functions [16], or
to Spohn ordinal conditional functions [2, 17] and thus to inﬁnitesimal probabilities [18],
among others.
2.1. Set functions in possibility theory
A possibility distribution π induces a possibility measure Π, deﬁned for A ⊆ U as [10]:
Π(A) = max
u∈A
π(u).
A dual measure N , called the necessity measure, is deﬁned for A ⊆ U as [11]:
N(A) = 1− Π(U \ A) = min
u/∈A
(1− π(u)).
Intuitively, Π(A) reﬂects to what extent it is possible, given the available knowledge, that the
value of X is among those in A, while N(A) reﬂects to what extent the available knowledge
entails that the value of X must necessarily be among those in A. Two other measures
that can be introduced are the guaranteed possibility measure ∆ and the potential necessity
measure ∇, deﬁned for A ⊆ U as [12]:
∆(A) = min
u∈A
π(u);
∇(A) = 1−∆(U \ A) = max
u∈A
(1− π(u)).
Intuitively, ∆(A) reﬂects the extent to which all values in A are considered possible, while
∇(A) reﬂects the extent to which some value outside A is impossible. Note that for all
A 6= ∅
∆(A) ≤ Π(A); N(A) ≤ ∇(A).
If π is normalized, we have Π(A) = 1 or N(A) = 0, and thus in particular:
N(A) ≤ Π(A).
If π(u) = 0 for some u ∈ U , we have ∆(A) = 0 or ∇(A) = 1, and thus:
∆(A) ≤ ∇(A).
Finally, note that Π and N are monotone w.r.t. set inclusion while ∆ and ∇ are antitone,
i.e., for A ⊆ B we have
Π(A) ≤ Π(B); N(A) ≤ N(B); ∆(A) ≥ ∆(B); ∇(A) ≥ ∇(B).
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2.2. Possibilistic logic
A formula in propositional possibilistic logic [1] (PL for short) is an expression of the
form (α, λ), where λ ∈]0, 1] is a certainty degree and α is a propositional formula, built from
a set of atomic formulas At using the connectives conjunction ∧, negation ¬, disjunction ∨,
implication →, and equivalence ≡ in the usual way. Let Ω be the set of all interpretations
of At and let L be the set of all propositional formulas built from At . The semantics
of possibilistic logic is deﬁned in terms of possibility distributions over Ω. Speciﬁcally, a
possibility distribution π over Ω satisﬁes the formula (α, λ) iﬀ N(JαK) ≥ λ, where JαK
denotes the set of all (classical) models of α. As π represents an epistemic state (it is a fuzzy
set of classical models), we call it an epistemic model of (α, λ), or an e-model for short. For
the ease of presentation, we will write N(α) instead of N(JαK) throughout this paper.
A possibility distribution π is an e-model of a set of PL formulas K iﬀ π is an e-model of
every formula in K. K generally has multiple e-models, but they can be partially ordered by
the speciﬁcity ordering, whereby π1 is less speciﬁc than π2, written π1 4 π2, if π1(ω) ≥ π2(ω)
for every ω ∈ Ω. It can be shown that the set of e-models of a set of PL formulas K has a
unique least element πK w.r.t. 4, which is called the least speciﬁc e-model of K. It can be
expressed, for all ω ∈ Ω as [1]:
πK(ω) = 1−max{λ | (α, λ) ∈ K,ω 6|= α}
where we assume max ∅ = 0. Intuitively, the more certain the formulas that are violated by
ω, the less plausible ω is considered to be.
The following inference rules are valid in PL:
if (α, λ) ∈ K then K⊢PL(α, λ) (1)
if ⊢α then K ⊢PL (α, 1) (2)
if λ1 ≥ λ2 and K⊢PL(α, λ1) then K⊢PL(α, λ2) (3)
if K⊢PL(α ∨ β, λ1) and K⊢PL(¬α ∨ γ, λ2) then K⊢PL(β ∨ γ,min(λ1, λ2)) (4)
Let us write K|=PL(α, λ) if every e-model of K is an e-model of (α, λ). If there is no cause
for confusion we also write |=PL as |= and ⊢PL as ⊢. It is possible to show that the following
statements are all equivalent for a set of PL formulas K (see e.g., [19]):
1. K⊢PL(α, λ) can be derived from (1)–(4).
2. K|=PL(α, λ)
3. The least speciﬁc e-model πK of K is an e-model of (α, λ).
Inference in possibilistic logic thus remains close to inference in propositional logic. In
particular, let the c-cut Kc of K be the propositional theory Kc = {α | (α, λ) ∈ K and λ ≥
c}. Then we have that K|=PL(α, λ) iﬀ Kλ∪{¬α} is unsatisﬁable. It follows that entailment
checking in possibilistic logic is coNP-complete and that eﬃcient reasoners can easily be
implemented on top of oﬀ-the-shelf SAT solvers.
Possibilistic logic can be seen as a tool for specifying a ranking on propositional formulas.
As such, it is closely related to the notion of epistemic entrenchment [20], as has been pointed
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out in [2]. This makes PL a natural vehicle for implementing strategies for belief revision [21]
and managing inconsistency [22]. Along similar lines, there are close connections between
PL and default reasoning in the sense of System P [5], which can be exploited to implement
several forms of reasoning about rules with exceptions [23].
Syntactically, propositional possibilistic logic is similar to the propositional fragment of
Markov logic [24]. Semantically, however, the certainty weights in Markov logic are inter-
preted probabilistically. In particular, a set M = {(α1, w1), ..., (αn, wn)} of (propositional)
Markov logic formulas deﬁnes the probability distribution pM deﬁned as follows (ω ∈ Ω):
pM(ω) =
1
Z
exp
(
n∑
i=1
{wi |ω |= αi}
)
(5)
where Z is a normalization constant. This probabilistic semantics makes Markov logic
particularly useful in machine learning settings. Note that we can equivalently deﬁne pM as
follows
pM(ω) =
1
Z ′
exp
(
n∑
i=1
{−wi |ω 6|= αi}
)
(6)
where the new normalization constant Z ′ is given by Z ′ = Zexp(∑i wi)
. This alternative
formulation highlights the close relationship between the propositional fragment of Markov
logic and the so-called penalty logic [25]. The two main diﬀerences are that negative weights
are not considered in penalty logic2 and that the penalty associated with an interpretation
is not normalized. This lack of normalization makes penalty logic somewhat closer in spirit
to possibilistic logic. Attaching a positive weight w to a formula α in penalty logic is similar
to attaching a degree of necessity 1 − exp(−w) to this formula in possibilistic logic. Thus
the main diﬀerence between penalty logic and possibilistic logic is that in the former case
the product is used to combine certainty degrees while in the latter case the minimum is
used.3
However, we can also view Markov logic, penalty logic and possibilistic logic as equivalent
frameworks for deﬁning rankings of possible worlds. Indeed, as was shown in [27], given a
Markov logic knowledge base M , we can always construct a possibilistic logic knowledge
base K such that M and K deﬁne the same ranking of possible worlds, and vice versa. In
fact, any ranking of interpretations can be represented by a possibilistic knowledge base.
3. Generalized possibilistic logic
While PL is useful to encode a single epistemic state, our aim is to develop GPL as a
logic for reasoning about the epistemic state of an agent from its revealed beliefs. A GPL
2Note however that in Markov logic, we can replace (α,w) by (¬α,−w) thanks to the use of the nor-
malization constant, so allowing negative weights does not increase the expressivity of propositional Markov
logic.
3Moreover, it is worth noticing that (6) deﬁnes the probability of an interpretation by using a possibility
distribution which is renormalized by dividing each possibility degree by their sum. See [26] for a discussion
of this type of possibility-probability transformation.
6
knowledge base then encodes the set of epistemic states that are compatible with these
revealed beliefs. The aim of this section is to deﬁne the syntax and semantics of GPL, and
to introduce an axiomatization for this logic. We will use α, β, etc. to denote propositions in
standard propositional logic, formed with the connectives, ∧ and ¬. As usual, we will also use
the abbreviations α∨β = ¬(¬α∧¬β), α→ β = ¬(α∧¬β) and α ≡ β = (α→ β)∧(β → α).
Let L be the language of all propositional formulas over a ﬁnite set of atomic propositions
At . Unless stated otherwise, we restrict the set of certainty degrees to the ﬁnite subset
Λk = {0,
1
k
, 2
k
, ..., 1} of the unit interval, with k ∈ N \ {0} and let Λ+k = Λk \ {0}.
3.1. Syntax
We deﬁne the language LkGPL of generalized possibilistic logic with k+1 certainty levels
as follows:
• If α ∈ L and λ ∈ Λ+k , then Nλ(α) ∈ L
k
GPL.
• If Φ ∈ LkGPL and Ψ ∈ L
k
GPL, then ¬Φ and Φ ∧Ψ are also in L
k
GPL.
The corresponding logic will be referred to as GPLk. When k is clear from the context we
will also refer to this logic as GPL, and to the corresponding language as LGPL. Note that
GPL is a graded version of the logic called MEL (Meta-Epistemic, or yet Minimal Epistemic,
Logic), which was introduced in [28]. The MEL language is a special case of GPL where
k = 1. Whereas MEL uses a standard modal logic syntax ( = N1), we use a modality which
refers to the necessity measure N to emphasize the link with possibility theory. Furthermore
note that we view LkGPL as a language with k diﬀerent modalities N 1
k
, ...,N1, rather than a
language with a single modality and constants denoting certainty degrees.
In the following, we will also use the following abbreviation:
Πλ(α) = ¬Nν(λ)(¬α) (7)
where we write ν(λ) as an abbreviation for 1 − λ + 1
k
. Semantically the modality Πλ will
correspond to a lower bound on a possibility measure, namely (7) is the counterpart of the
duality between a possibility and a necessity measure on a ﬁnite scale, where we have to
shift from one level for moving from a strict inequality to an inequality in the broad sense.
Let us deﬁne a meta-atom as an expression of the form Nλ(α), and a meta-literal as
an expression of the form Nλ(α) or ¬Nλ(α). A meta-clause is an expression of the form
Φ1∨...∨Φn with each Φi a meta-literal. A meta-term is an expression of the form Φ1∧...∧Φn
with each Φi a meta-literal.
3.2. Semantics
The semantics of GPL are deﬁned in terms of normalized possibility distributions over
propositional interpretations, encoding epistemic states, where possibility degrees are, by
duality, of the form 1 − λ, ∀λ ∈ Λk.
4 Let Pk be the set of all such possibility distributions.
An e-model of a GPL formula is any possibility distribution π from Pk, namely:
4In our conventions, it comes down to using Λk as both a certainty and a possibility scale.
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• π is an e-model of Nλ(α) iﬀ N(α) ≥ λ;
• π is an e-model of Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iﬀ π is an e-model of Φ1 and of Φ2;
• π is an e-model of ¬Φ1 iﬀ π is not an e-model of Φ1;
where N is the necessity measure induced by π. As usual, π is called an e-model of a set of
GPL formulas K, written π|=kGPLK, if it is an e-model of each formula in K. It is called a
minimally speciﬁc e-model of K if there is no e-model π′ 6= π of K such that π′(ω) ≥ π(ω)
for each possible world ω. We write K|=kGPLφ, for K a set of GPL formulas and φ a GPL
formula, if every e-model of K is also an e-model of φ. When k is clear from the context,
we will sometimes write |=kGPL as |=GPL; furthermore, if there is no cause for confusion, we
will also write |=kGPL as |=.
Intuitively, N1(α) means that it is completely certain that α is true, whereas Nλ(α) with
λ < 1 means that there is evidence which suggests that α is true, and none that suggests
that it is false. Note that we can distinguish between complete and partial certainty only if
k ≥ 2. Formally, an agent assertingNλ(α) has an epistemic state π such that N(α) ≥ λ > 0.
Hence ¬Nλ(α) stands for N(α) < λ, which means Π(¬α) ≥ 1 − λ +
1
k
. The abbreviation
introduced in (7) thus corresponds to a syntactic counterpart of the duality between necessity
and possibility measures. Note how the use of a ﬁnite scale makes it possible to express strict
inequalities, even though we only use inequalities in the wide sense in the interpretation of
graded modalities. Intuitively Π1(α) means that α is fully compatible with our available
beliefs (i.e., nothing prevents α from being true), while Πλ(α) with λ < 1 means that α
cannot be fully excluded (Π(α) ≥ λ).
This formalism is similar to an autoepistemic logic [29, 6]. However the latter aims to
capture how an agent reasons about its own beliefs. One crucial diﬀerence, which has been
pointed out in [30], is that when reasoning about one’s own beliefs, it should not be possible
to state N1(α) ∨N1(β) without either stating N1(α) or N1(β). Indeed, if we accept that
an agent is aware of its epistemic state, the agent can tell, for each propositional formula,
whether or not it is believed. Accordingly, in standard possibilistic logic, we cannot encode
N1(α)∨N1(β). We can just encode N1(α) or N1(β), or their conjunction. However, we will
be able to overcome this limitation in GPL. More generally, in a graded setting, if the agent
is aware of its epistemic state, it can tell which of two propositional formulas it considers to
be most certain. This is again in accordance with possibilistic logic, whereas in GPL we will
be able to encode the case where we are ignorant about which of two formulas is most certain
for an external agent. This suggests that while standard possibilistic logic oﬀers a natural
setting for reasoning with one’s own beliefs, GPL naturally lends itself to reasoning about
another agent’s beliefs. For this reason, we could say that GPL is an “alter-epistemic”
logic.
As to the possible kinds of conclusions that can be inferred from a GPL base K regarding
a propositional formula α, if k = 2, one can distinguish between the following ﬁve cases:
• K |= N1(α) means that we know that the agent knows that α is true.
• K |= N1(¬α) means that we know that the agent knows that α is false.
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• K |= N1(α) ∨N1(¬α), K 6|= N1(α) and K 6|= N1(¬α) means that we know that the
agent knows whether α is true or false, but we do not know which it is.
• K |= Π1(α) ∧Π1(¬α) means that we know that the agent is ignorant about whether
α is true or false.
• K 6|= N1(α) ∨N1(¬α) and K 6|= Π1(α) ∧Π1(¬α) means that we are ignorant about
whether the agent is ignorant about α.
This is in contrast with the only three situations that can be distinguished in classical logic
(and in PL), i.e., we know that α is true, we know that α is false, or we do not know
whether α is true or false. When k > 2, we can consider graded counterparts of the ﬁve
aforementioned cases. Moreover, a GPL base can then also express comparative uncertainty.
For example:
• K |=
∨k
i=1N i
k
(α) ∧ ¬N i
k
(β): we know that the agent is more certain that α holds
than that β holds, noticing that it is equivalent to ∃i, N(α) ≥ i
k
> N(β).
• K |=
∨k
i=1Π i
k
(α) ∧ ¬Π i
k
(β): we know that the agent would be less surprised to
learn that α is true than to learn that β is true, noticing that it is equivalent to
∃i .Π(α) ≥ i
k
> Π(β).
• K |=
∨k
i=1(N i
k
(α) ∨N i
k
(¬α)) ∧ ¬N i
k
(β) ∧ ¬N i
k
(¬β): we know that the agent is more
certain about the truth or the falsity of α than about β, but we may not know with
which certainty degree the agent knows the truth value of α, nor to what extent this
certainty degree is greater than the certainty degree about the truth or the falsity of
β.
• K |=
∨k
i=1(N i
k
(α)∧¬N i
k
(β))∨ (N i
k
(β)∧¬N i
k
(α)): we know that the agent considers
one of α, β more certain than the other, but we may not know which.
• K |=
∧k
i=1(N i
k
(α)→ N i
k
(β)) expresses that the agent is at least as certain about β as
about α.
Example 1. The six nations championship is a rugby competition consisting of 5 rounds.
In each round, every team plays against one of the other 5 teams, so that over 5 rounds all
teams have played once against each other. Let us write playsi(x, y) to denote that x and y
have played against each other in round i, and woni(x) to denote that team x has won its
game in round i. Let T = {eng, fra, ire, ita, sco,wal}. To express that an agent knows the
rules of the championship, we can consider formulas such as, among others:
N1(
∨
{playsi(x, u) | u 6= x, u ∈ T}) (8)
where x ∈ T . A formula such as N 3
4
(won1(wal)) means that the agent strongly believes, but
is not fully certain, that Wales (wal) has won its first round game, while Π 3
4
(won1(wal))
9
means that the agent does not exclude that Wales has won its first round game, without
evidence as to the contrary. The following formula expresses that the agent considers it
more plausible that Wales has won its first game than that England (eng) has won its first
game
k∨
i=1
Π i
k
(won1(wal)) ∧ ¬Π i
k
(won1(eng)) (9)
Recall that the certainty degrees in GPL are typically only assumed to have an ordinal
meaning. Saying that the necessity of a formula is 3
4
then does not have any intrinsic
meaning, other than the fact that this formula is considered e.g., more certain than a formula
with necessity 1
2
and less certain than a formula with necessity 7
8
. The above example
illustrates two alternative ways in which applications can deal with such ordinal certainty
degrees. One idea is to use a small number of categories that are meaningful to a user, such
as e.g., ‘completely certain’, ‘very certain’, ‘quite certain’, ‘somewhat certain’, and map
these categories to the available elements from Λk (e.g., ‘very certain’ could correspond to
a necessity of 3
4
). The second idea would be to avoid assigning certainty degrees, and only
express certainty in a comparative way, as is illustrated in (9). This second approach will
be discussed in more detail in Section 5.
3.3. Axiomatization
We consider the following axiomatization, which closely parallels the one of MEL [28]:
(PL) The axioms of classical logic for meta-formulas.
(K) Nλ(α→ β)→ (Nλ(α)→ Nλ(β)).
(N) N1(α) whenever α ∈ L is a classical tautology.
(D) Nλ(α)→ Π1(α).
(W) Nλ1(α)→ Nλ2(α), if λ1 ≥ λ2.
If Φ can be derived from a set of GPL formulas K using the axioms (PL), (K), (N), (D),
(W) and modus ponens, we write K ⊢GPL Φ; if there is no cause for confusion we also write
K ⊢ Φ. Note in particular that when λ is ﬁxed we get a fragment of the modal logic KD. In
particular, the axioms entail that Nλ(α∧β) is equivalent to Nλ(α)∧Nλ(β). It is easy to see
that if α and β are logically equivalent formulas, then Nλ(α) and Nλ(β) are also equivalent.
Indeed, in that case, (α → β) ∧ (β → α) holds, and by applying (N), (W), (K), (D) we
get both Nλ(α)→ Nλ(β) and Nλ(β)→ Nλ(α). Also note that from (N) and (W) we can
derive a graded version of the necessitation rule, i.e., if ⊢ α then ⊢GPL Nλ(α) for any λ ∈ Λk.
Finally note that in the case where k = 1, GPL coincides with the logic MEL. In this latter
case, we have Π1(α) = ¬N1(¬α) whereas in general we only have Π1(α) = ¬N 1
k
(¬α). As
we will see in Section 6, the ability to diﬀerentiate between full possibility for α and the
lack of full certainty for ¬α is crucial when using GPL to provide a semantics for negation
as failure.
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Proposition 1 (Soundness and completeness). Let K be a set of GPL formulas and Φ a
GPL formula. It holds that K |=GPL Φ iff K ⊢GPL Φ.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A.
The main idea behind the proof is that we can see formulas in GPL as propositional
formulas which are built from the set of atomic formulas of LkGPL. Given a knowledge base
K in GPL, we construct a propositional base K∗ made of formulas of K plus axioms of
GPL, viewed as propositional formulas as well. We then show that there exists a bijection
between the set of propositional models of K∗ (seen as a propositional logic knowledge base)
and the set of e-models of K (seen as a GPL knowledge base). A very similar strategy has
been used, among others, in [44], [82] and [45, 46], in the context of multi-valued modal
logics for reasoning about necessity (see Section 3.4).
Proposition 1 remains valid even if the set At of atomic propositions is countably inﬁnite.
On the other hand, the completeness result no longer holds if inﬁnitely many certainty
degrees are allowed in the language, as e.g. {Nλ(a) |λ <
1
2
} |=GPL N 1
2
(a), for a ∈ At but
{Nλ(a) |λ <
1
2
} 6⊢GPL N 1
2
(a). This is not a real restriction, since knowledge bases only have
ﬁnitely many formulas in practice, which means that only ﬁnitely many certainty levels
actually need to be used, and since the semantics of GPL is based on the relative ordering of
the certainty degrees, we can then always map these certainty degrees to Λk for some k. In
Section 5, however, we will discuss an extension of GPL in which we can express comparative
uncertainty statements, where it will be desirable to allow an unbounded number of certainty
degrees at the semantic level.
Using Proposition 1, and some well-known properties on necessity and possibility mea-
sures, it follows that the following formulas are theorems in GPL:
Nλ(α) ∧Nλ(β) ≡ Nλ(α ∧ β)
Πλ(α ∧ β)→ Πλ(α) ∧Πλ(β)
Nλ(α) ∨Nλ(β)→ Nλ(α ∨ β)
Πλ(α) ∨Πλ(β) ≡ Πλ(α ∨ β)
Next is a counterpart to the modus ponens rule in PL (4):
Nλ1(α) ∧Nλ2(α→ β)→ Nmin(λ1,λ2)(β) (10)
To show that this is a theorem in GPL, thanks to Proposition 1, it suﬃces to note that
every necessity measure N satisfying N(α) ≥ λ1 and N(¬α ∨ β) ≥ λ2 also satisﬁes N(β) ≥
min(λ1, λ2), which is equivalent to the usual modus ponens in PL, a special case of (4). To see
how (10) can be derived from the axioms of GPL, note that the deduction theorem is valid in
GPL, and it thus suﬃces to show that Nmin(λ1,λ2)(β) can be derived from {Nλ1(α),Nλ2(α→
β)}. Starting from this latter set of premises, we apply (W) to obtain Nmin(λ1,λ2)(α) and
Nmin(λ1,λ2)(α → β). Applying modus ponens on axiom (K) and Nmin(λ1,λ2)(α → β), we
obtain Nmin(λ1,λ2)(α) → Nmin(λ1,λ2)(β). Using modus ponens on the latter formula and
Nmin(λ1,λ2)(α) we obtain Nmin(λ1,λ2)(β).
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The following theorem is the counterpart of a hybrid modus ponens rule introduced in
[31]:
Πλ1(α) ∧Nλ2(α→ β)→ Πλ1(β), if λ2 > 1− λ1 (11)
Again a direct proof can be given, using the deduction theorem, by proving Nν(λ1)(¬α) from
Nλ2(α→ β) and Nν(λ1)(¬β) in the same way (just rewriting α→ β as ¬β → ¬α). However,
we need to assume ν(λ1) ≤ λ2 in order to weaken Nλ2(α → β) into Nν(λ1)(α → β). And
ν(λ1) ≤ λ2 is equivalent to 1− λ1 +
1
k
≤ λ2, i.e., λ2 > 1− λ1
5.
Resolution rules in possibilistic logic [31], extending (10) and (11), can be proved likewise
in GPL or, alternatively, by using the decomposability of Nλ(·) w.r.t. conjunction.
3.4. Related work
Although possibility theory has been the basis of an original theory of approximate
reasoning [32], it was not introduced as a logical setting for epistemic reasoning, strictly
speaking. Nonetheless, in the setting of his representation language PRUF [33], Zadeh
discusses the representation of statements of the form “X is A” (meaning that the possible
values of the single-valued variable X are fuzzily restricted by fuzzy set A), linguistically
qualiﬁed in terms of truth, probability, or possibility. Interestingly, the representation of
possibility-qualiﬁed statements led to possibility distributions over possibility distributions,
but certainty-qualiﬁed statements, ﬁrst considered in [34] (see also [11]), and used as the
basic building blocks of possibilistic logic, were not considered at all, just because necessity
measures as the dual of possibility measures were playing almost no role in Zadeh’s view
(with the exception of half a page in [35]). Possibility-qualiﬁed statements were exploited in
[31] in relation with a weighted resolution principle extending the inference rule (11), whose
formal analogy with an inference rule existing in modal logic was stressed.
The similarity between possibility theory (including necessity measures) and modal logic
should not come as a surprise since the analogy between the duality property N(A) =
1 − Π(Ω \ A) in possibility theory and the deﬁnition of ♦p as ¬¬p is striking, and has
been known for a long time [36]. Likewise, the axiom p → ♦p (axiom D in modal logic
systems) may encode the inequality N(A) ≤ Π(A), and the characteristic axiom of necessity
measures N(A∩B) = min(N(A), N(B)) corresponds to the theorem (p∧q)↔ (p∧ q)
which is valid in modal system K. Nevertheless, no formally established connection between
modal logic and possibility theory existed until the late 1980s.
This striking parallel between possibility theory and modal logic eventually led to pro-
posals for a modal analysis and encoding of possibility theory. For instance, L. Farin˜as and
A. Herzig [37] proposed such an encoding by heavily relying on Lewis’ conditional logics of
comparative possibility [38], as indeed the only numerical counterparts of Lewis possibility
relations are possibility measures [39]. Another attempt was later made by Boutilier [40], in
the scope of non-monotonic inference based on a plausibility relation over possible worlds.
The idea was to use this ordinal counterpart of a possibility distribution as an accessibility
5If ν(λ1) > λ2, the weakening axiom (W) leads us to derive Nλ2(¬α), whose negation is weaker than
the premise Πλ1(α).
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relation and to construct modalities from it. Another, more semantically-oriented trend was
to build speciﬁc accessibility relations agreeing with possibility theory [41, 42].
A major diﬀerence with GPL is that the semantics of the above logics relies on acces-
sibility relations. GPL can be embedded into a multimodal logic, but it is actually just a
two-level propositional logic since its semantics is based on graded epistemic states, viewed as
higher-order interpretations, not relying on accessibility relations. This point was discussed
in [43]: relational semantics of epistemic logics may make sense in the scope of introspective
reasoning, but appears more diﬃcult to justify for modelling partial knowledge about the
epistemic state of an external agent. In GPL, any agent is supposed to be aware of its own
epistemic state, so it can model its own beliefs using a complete GPL base (see Section
4 on this point). Also, formally, GPL is a complexiﬁcation of propositional logic, adding
weighted modalities in front of propositional formulas only, and, at the semantic level, mov-
ing from usual interpretations to sets thereof, while simple epistemic logics like S5 or KD45
are constructed as a simpliﬁcation of a complex logic allowing nested modalities naturally
interpreted via accessibility relations, and need introspection axioms to simplify complex
formulas into equivalent ones of depth at most 1. So beyond the formal analogies between
modal logic and GPL, the motivations and the construction method are radically diﬀerent.
A proposal closer to GPL is the one of Ha´jek [44], where possibility theory is cast
into a many-valued logic setting, using many-valued modal formulas. The main diﬀerence
with GPL, from a formal point of view, is that necessity is expressed as a single multi-
valued modality, rather than a set of classical modalities in GPL. This implies that necessity
statements need to be combined using a fuzzy logic, rather than classical propositional logic
in GPL. A number of related logics are studied in [45, 46], which are using variants of
 Lukasiewicz logic both for the formulas inside the modalities and for combining the multi-
valued modalities. In case these variants of  Lukasiewicz are ﬁnite-valued (or e.g., include
the Baaz ∆ connective [47]), it is easy to see that GPL can be framed as a fragment of
such a multi-valued modal logic. A general completeness result for such two-tiered (multi-
valued) model logics has been introduced in [48]. Liau and Lin [49] have also studied a
modal logic which is very similar to GPL, albeit using [0, 1] as a possibility scale (which
forces them to introduce additional multimodal formulas to deal with strict inequalities).
Their tableau-based proof methods could be of interest to develop inference techniques for
GPL.
While from a formal point of view, GPL is close to some of these aforementioned logics,
our focus in this paper is rather diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, our main aim is to study what is
gained, in terms of the kinds of epistemic reasoning scenarios that can be modelled, from
the increase in syntactic freedom compared to standard possibilistic logic. Among others,
we will analyse several ways in which partial ignorance can be modelled, study the relation
between GPL and logics of comparative uncertainty, and show how diﬀerent forms of non-
monotonic reasoning can naturally be modelled using GPL. To the best of our knowledge,
these links with possibilistic logic (or the related multi-valued modal logics) have not been
studied in previous work.
13
4. Reasoning about ignorance in GPL
Possibility theory oﬀers a number of tools for modelling limitations on what is known.
These tools can be used in GPL to explicitly model what we know that an external agent does
not know. In particular, Section 4.1 proposes a method based on the guaranteed possibility
measure, which is subsequently reﬁned in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we then analyse how
the principle of minimal speciﬁcity can be applied to reason about what an external agent
does not know.
4.1. Ignorance as guaranteed possibility
Using the modalitiesN andΠ we can model constraints of the formN(α) ≥ λ, N(α) ≤ λ,
Π(α) ≥ λ and Π(α) ≤ λ. So far, however, we have not considered the guaranteed possibility
measure ∆ and potential necessity measure ∇. Counterparts of these measures can be
introduced as abbreviations in the language, by noting that ∆(α) = minω∈JαK Π({ω}). For a
propositional interpretation ω let us write conjω for the conjunction of all literals made true
by ω, i.e., conjω =
∧
ω|=a a ∧
∧
ω|=¬a ¬a. Then we deﬁne:
∆λ(α) =
∧
ω∈JαK
Πλ(conjω) ∇λ(α) = ¬∆ν(λ)(¬α) (12)
In fact, since Π(α) = maxω∈JαK ∆({ω}), another strategy we could have taken is to axiomatize
a logic based on guaranteed possibility, and to deﬁne the modality N as an abbreviation. In
particular, such a logic could be axiomatized by using the following graded version of the
data logic of Dubois, Ha´jek and Prade [50]:
(PL) The axioms of classical logic for meta-formulas.
(K∆) ∆λ(α ∧ ¬β)→ (∆λ(¬α)→∆λ(¬β)).
(∆) ∆1(α) whenever ¬α ∈ L is a tautology.
(D∆) ∆λ(α)→ ∇1(α).
(W∆) ∆λ1(α)→∆λ2(α), if λ1 ≥ λ2.
and the modus ponens rule. We could then also introduce the following abbreviations:
Πλ(α) =
∨
ω∈JαK
∆λ(conjω) (13)
Nλ(α) = ¬Πν(λ)(¬α) (14)
The resulting logic is very similar to GPL. However, for (D∆) to be sound, we need to restrict
e-models to possibility distributions π for which π(ω) = 0 for at least one propositional
interpretation ω. Similarly, for these axioms to be complete, we need to drop the requirement
that π(ω) = 1 for at least one interpretation. In fact, the soundness and completeness result
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from Proposition 1 can straightforwardly be adapted to a logic centered on the ∆ modality,
by taking advantage of the following duality:
π |= Nλ(α) iﬀ π |=∆λ(¬α) (15)
where the possibility distribution π is deﬁned as π(ω) = 1−π(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. This duality
can be readily veriﬁed using the deﬁnitions of the N and ∆ measures in possibility theory
(see Section 2.1).
However it is straightforward to show that (K∆), (∆) and (W∆) are valid in GPL. We
can furthermore show that the following formulas are valid in GPL:
∆λ(α) ∧∆λ(β) ≡∆λ(α ∨ β) ∇λ(α ∨ β)→ ∇λ(α) ∧∇λ(β)
∆λ(α) ∨∆λ(β)→∆λ(α ∧ β) ∇λ(α) ∨∇λ(β) ≡ ∇λ(α ∧ β)
and
∆λ1(α ∧ β) ∧∆λ2(¬α ∧ γ)→∆min(λ1,λ2)(β ∧ γ) (16)
∇λ1(α ∧ β) ∧∆λ2(¬α ∧ γ)→ ∇λ1(β ∧ γ), if λ2 ≥ ν(λ1) (17)
Note that (16) is the counterpart of a basic inference rule of the logic of accumulated data
[50].
For any possibility distribution π over Ω, we can easily deﬁne a GPL knowledge base
which has π as its only e-model, using the modality ∆. In particular, let α1, ..., αk be
propositional formulas such that JαiK = {ω | π(ω) ≥
i
k
}. Then we deﬁne the knowledge base
Φπ as:
Φπ =
k∧
i=1
Nν( i
k
)(αi) ∧∆ i
k
(αi). (18)
A formula of the form Φπ deﬁnes a GPL base which is complete in the following sense.
Proposition 2. ∀α ∈ L, λ ∈ Λ,Φπ ⊢ Nλ(α) or Φπ ⊢ ¬Nλ(α)
Proof. In Equation (18), the degree of possibility of each ω ∈ JαiK is deﬁned by inequalities
from above and from below. Indeed, ∆ i
k
(αi) means that π(ω) ≥
i
k
for all ω ∈ JαiK, whereas,
Nν( i
k
)(αi) means π(ω) ≤
i−1
k
for all ω /∈ JαiK. It follows that π(ω) = 0 if ω /∈ Jα1K, π(ω) =
i
k
if ω ∈ JαiK\ Jαi+1K (for i < k) and π(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ JαkK. In other words, π is indeed the only
e-model of Φπ. Since we clearly have N(α) ≥ λ or ¬(N(α) ≥ λ) for any necessity measure,
it follows that Φπ ⊢ Nλ(α) or Φπ ⊢ ¬Nλ(α).
If we view the epistemic state of an agent as a possibility distribution, this means that
every epistemic state can be modelled using a GPL knowledge base. Conceptually, the
construction of Φπ relates to the notion of “only knowing” from Levesque [6]. For example,
assume that we want to model that all the agent knows is that β is true with certainty j
k
.
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Then we have π(ω) = 1 for ω ∈ JβK and π(ω) = k−j
k
for ω /∈ JβK. This means that in the
notation of (18), αk−j+1 = ...αk = β and we obtain Φπ=∆1(β)∧Nν( k−j+1
k
)(β)∧∆ k−j
k
(⊤). In
the case when k = 1, Equation (18) reads N1(α)∧∆1(α) and isolates a single crisp e-model
corresponding to the set of classical models of α as already pointed out in [28]. It expresses
that we precisely know the epistemic state of the external agent, namely that (s)he only
knows that α is true.
In practice, we will often have incomplete knowledge about the epistemic state of this
agent. Suppose we only know that the epistemic state is among those in S ⊆ Pk. This
can be encoded as a GPL knowledge base ΦS =
∨
π∈S Φπ with Φπ deﬁned as above. As a
consequence, any GPL knowledge base is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
ΦS, and any subset of epistemic states can be captured by a GPL knowledge base.
Since the modality ∆ was introduced as an abbreviation, allowing this modality has no
impact on the expressiveness of the language or on the completeness of the axiomatization.
However, the formula ∆λ(α) abbreviates a GPL formula which may be of exponential size,
and allowing the modality ∆ in the language is thus essential if we want to capture our
knowledge about an agent’s epistemic state in a compact way. As we will see in Section 7,
this is reﬂected in an increase in computational complexity.
4.2. Contextual ignorance as restricted guaranteed possibility
The modality ∆ allows us to express limitations on what an agent knows. However, it
does not readily allow us to explicitly encode the ignorance of an agent on a particular topic.
Example 2. Consider again the scenario from Example 1 and suppose we want to encode
that “all the agent knows about the games in round 3 is that Wales has won its game”.
We cannot represent this as N1(won3(wal)) ∧ ∆1(won3(wal)), as that would entail e.g.,
¬N1(won2(wal)), which is not warranted.
To encode limitations on the knowledge of the agent on a particular topic, understood as a
set of propositional variables X ⊆ At , we propose the following variant of the ∆ modality:
∆Xλ (α) =
∧
ω∈JαK
Πλ(conj
X
ω )
where conjXω is the restriction of conjω to those literals about variables in X , i.e., conj
X
ω =∧
{x | x ∈ X , ω |= x} ∧
∧
{¬x | x ∈ X , ω |= ¬x}. Note that |=GPL∆λ(α) ≡ ∆
At
λ (α). For
example, in the scenario from Example 2, instead of asserting ∆1(won3(wal)), we can assert
∆X1 (won3(wal)), with X = {plays3(x, y) | x, y ∈ T} ∪ {won3(x) | x ∈ T} the set of all atomic
formulas about round 3 of the championship. As we will see in Section 7, allowing this
reﬁnement of the ∆ modality leads to a further increase in computational complexity.
4.3. Ignorance as minimal specificity
The less speciﬁc than relation 4 deﬁnes a partial order on the set of e-models of a
GPL knowledge base K in a natural way, which allows us to introduce two non-monotonic
entailment relations:
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• We say that Φ is a brave consequence of K, written K |=b Φ iﬀ Φ is satisﬁed by a
minimally speciﬁc e-model of K.
• We say that Φ is a cautious consequence of K, written K |=c Φ iﬀ Φ is satisﬁed by all
minimally speciﬁc e-models of K.
In standard possibilistic logic, every knowledge base K has a least speciﬁc e-model πK . As
a result, in standard possibilistic logic, the entailment relations |=, |=b and |=c coincide. In
GPL, this is no longer the case.
Example 3. Let u, v, w ∈ At. The formula N1(u) ∨ N1(v) has two minimally specific
e-models πu and πv defined as:
πu(ω) =
{
0 if ω |= ¬u
1 otherwise
πv(ω) =
{
0 if ω |= ¬v
1 otherwise
(19)
This already shows that |= and |=b do not coincide, as e.g., N1(u) ∨N1(v) |=b N1(u) while
clearly N1(u)∨N1(v) 6|= N1(u). To see why |= and |=c do not coincide, note that since u, v
and w are logically independent, N1(u)∨N1(v) |=c Π1(w)∧Π1(¬w) while N1(u)∨N1(v) 6|=
Π1(w) ∧Π1(¬w).
Reasoning about what is true in all minimally speciﬁc e-models, as opposed to all e-
models, is similar to making a kind of meta-closed-world assumption. Intuitively, it amounts
to assuming that the agent is ignorant about a formula α unless it has been asserted that the
agent knows whether α is true or false. For example, in the scenario from Example 2, we can
simply assert N1(won3(wal)), as the knowledge that the agent is ignorant about anything
else related to round 3 is implicit in the fact that no other knowledge has been asserted.
However, even under this assumption, there may be situations in which we are ignorant
about whether the agent knows whether α is true, as illustrated in the next example.
Example 4. Consider again the formula N1(u)∨N1(v) and its minimally specific e-models
πu and πv from Example 3. It holds thatN1(u)∨N1(v) 6|=c N1(u)∨N1(¬u) (since πv 6|= N1(u)
and πv 6|= N1(¬u)), i.e., we cannot conclude that the agent knows about u. However, we
also have N1(u) ∨N1(v) 6|=c Π1(u) ∧Π1(¬u) (since πu |= N1(u)), i.e., we cannot conclude
that the agent is ignorant about u either.
In [30], it is argued that the epistemic state of an agent can be modelled as a propositional
formula α, although through introspection the agent knows more than what is encoded by
α directly. For example, if α 6|= β, the agent knows that it does not know β in this setting.
In GPL, we can characterize what the agent knows (with full certainty) as the consequences
of N1(α) under the inference relation |=c, which coincides with |=b in this case, since N1(α)
has a unique least speciﬁc e-model. In particular, the argument of [30], translated to the
terminology of this paper, is that theories which model the epistemic state of an agent
should have such a unique least speciﬁc e-model. Formulas for which this is not the case
(e.g., N1(a) ∨N1(b)) are called dishonest by [30]. In our setting, however, we should not
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Table 1: Overview of the considered variants of GPL.
logic meta-atoms axioms e-models
GPL Nλ(α) (PL), (K), (N), (D), (W) possibility degrees from Λk
GPLcore
≻
α ≻ β (PL), (Ax1)–(Ax5) possibility degrees from [0, 1] ∩Q
GPL≻ Nλ(α), α ≻ β (PL), (W), (Ax1)–(Ax8) possibility degrees from [0, 1] ∩Q
GPLc c(α|∼β) (PL), (RE), (LLE), (RW), (OR), possibility degrees from [0, 1] ∩Q
(CM), (CUT), (WRM), (INC)
exclude GPL formulas which have multiple minimally speciﬁc e-models, if our aim is to
reason about the revealed beliefs of another agent. Indeed, such situations can easily arise if
we have incomplete information about the epistemic state of an external agent. For example,
we may know that this agent has received and read the notiﬁcation email on a submitted
conference paper, while not knowing whether the paper has been accepted or rejected. In
that case we know N1(accept) ∨ N1(¬accept), i.e., all we know is that the external agent
knows the result with certainty.
5. Reasoning about comparative uncertainty
In this section, we analyze in more detail how GPL can be used for reasoning about
comparative uncertainty. First, in Section 5.1, we introduce the logic GPL≻, which extends
GPL with formulas of the form α ≻ β, expressing that α is strictly more certain than β. We
will also consider a fragment GPLcore≻ of this logic, in which only (propositional combinations
of) such comparative certainty assertions are allowed. In Section 5.2 we then propose an
axiomatization of GPLcore≻ , by extending the axiomatization of a logic for reasoning about
partially ordered formulas [7]. This axiomatization is subsequently extended to an axiom-
atization of GPL≻ in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section 5.4 we show how the ability of GPL
to capture comparative uncertainty can be used to reason about propositional combinations
of default rules in the sense of System P [5], and we introduce a variant of GPLcore≻ , called
GPLc, which is aimed speciﬁcally at reasoning about propositional combinations of default
rules.
Table 1 presents an overview of the considered logics. Like GPL itself, each of the logics
introduced in this section is two-tiered, in the sense that formulas correspond to propositional
combinations of meta-atoms, and each meta-atom corresponds to a modal operator applied
to one or two propositional formulas. From a syntactic point of view, the only diﬀerence
between the diﬀerent logics lies in the considered modal operators. From a semantic point
of view, an important diﬀerence between GPL and the variants considered in this section is
that here we will allow inﬁnitely many possibility degrees.
5.1. A logic for comparative uncertainty
Rather than expressing absolute degrees of certainty in the logic, one may ﬁnd it more
natural to simply express the fact that a proposition α is at least as (resp. more) certain
than another one β. In possibility theory, this can be expressed as N(α) ≥ N(β) (resp.
N(α) > N(β)). The statement N(α) ≥ N(β) is equivalent to ∀λ ∈ Λ+k , N(β) ≥ λ implies
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N(α) ≥ λ. In GPL, as already pointed out in Section 3.2, the latter expression can be
syntactically described as
k∧
i=1
N i
k
(α) ∨ ¬N i
k
(β).
The statement N(α) > N(β) is the negation of N(β) ≥ N(α), hence it can be encoded by
k∨
i=1
N i
k
(α) ∧ ¬N i
k
(β)
as was already illustrated in Example 1.
So far, we have assumed that the number of certainty levels k is ﬁxed in advance. If k is
not chosen suﬃciently large, however, this can lead to some unwanted results. For example,
if k = 2, the following statement, expressing N(α1) > N(α2) > N(α3) > N(α4) is not
satisﬁable:
( k∨
i=1
N i
k
(α1) ∧ ¬N i
k
(α2)
)
∧
( k∨
i=1
N i
k
(α2) ∧ ¬N i
k
(α3)
)
∧
( k∨
i=1
N i
k
(α3) ∧ ¬N i
k
(α4)
)
In a purely ordinal setting, however, we would not expect a formula asserting N(α1) >
N(α2) > N(α3) > N(α4) to be always unsatisﬁable. To address this issue, we introduce
GPL≻, a logic for reasoning about comparative uncertainty in which an unbounded number
of certainty levels can be used at the semantic level. The language L≻ of the logic GPL≻ is
deﬁned as follows:
• If α ∈ L and λ ∈ Λ+k , then Nλ(α) belongs to L≻;
• if α, β ∈ L then α ≻ β belongs to L≻;
• if Φ and Ψ belong to L≻, then ¬Φ and Φ ∧Ψ are also in L≻.
At the semantic level, e-models will be allowed to take arbitrary values from Λ∗ = [0, 1]∩Q.
As a result, Πλ(α) cannot be deﬁned as an abbreviation in GPL≻. We will use α ∼ β as
an abbreviation for ¬(α ≻ β) ∧ ¬(β ≻ α) and α  β as an abbreviation of ¬(β ≻ α). Note
that this reﬂects the fact that at the semantic level,  will be a complete preordering with
∼ as its equivalence part. Intuitively, α ≻ β means that α is strictly more certain than β,
α  β means that α is at least as certain as β, and α ∼ β means that α is equally certain
as β.
Let π be a normalized possibility distribution over Ω such that π(ω) ∈ Λ∗ for every ω ∈ Ω,
and let N be the necessity measure induced by π. The notion of e-model for formulas from
L≻ is deﬁned as follows:
• π is an e-model of Nλ(α) if N(α) ≥ λ;
• π is an e-model of α ≻ β iﬀ N(α) > N(β);
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• π is an e-model of Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iﬀ π is an e-model of Φ1 and of Φ2;
• π is an e-model of ¬Φ1 iﬀ π is not an e-model of Φ1.
If π is an e-model of Φ we write π |=≻ Φ, and if every e-model of a set of GPL≻ formulas
K is also an e-model of Φ, we write K |=≻ Φ. If there is no cause for confusion, we also
write |=≻ as |=.
In the following, we will also consider the fragment GPLcore≻ of GPL≻, which is restricted
to the language Lcore≻ , deﬁned as follows:
• if α, β ∈ L then α ≻ β belongs to Lcore≻ ;
• if Φ and Ψ belong to Lcore≻ , then ¬Φ and Φ ∧Ψ are also in L
core
≻ .
In other words, GPLcore≻ is concerned only with propositional combinations of comparative
certainty statements, while in GPL≻ we also allow statements such as N 1
2
(α) ∨ (α ≻ β).
5.2. Axiomatizing GPLcore≻
In this section, we introduce an axiomatization for the logic GPLcore≻ . To this end, we
start from the axiomatization of the relative certainty logic that was studied by Touazi et
al. [7]. A knowledge base in this latter logic is a conjunction of statements of the form
α ≻ β, i.e., the language they considered is the disjunction- and negation-free fragment of
Lcore≻ . In [7] axiomatization for the resulting logic was introduced, inspired by an earlier
axiomatization that was proposed in [51]. It contains one axiom:
(Ax1) α ≻ ⊥ if α is a tautology
and three inference rules:
(RI1) If β ≻ α ∧ χ and α ≻ β ∧ χ then β ∧ α ≻ χ
(RI2) If α ≻ β, α  α
′ and β′  β then α′ ≻ β′
(RI3) If α ≻ β and β ≻ α then ⊥
Note that the reason why (RI1)–(RI3) were formulated as inference rules in [7], rather than
axioms, is because propositional combinations of comparative certainty statements were not
considered in [7]. (RI1) is the so-called qualitativeness axiom [51] that ensures that if both
α and β are more certain than χ then so is α ∧ β, which is only compatible with necessity
measures in the totally ordered case. (RI2) is a natural mononicity assumption in agreement
with logical entailment.
The axiom and inference rules are suﬃcient to ensure that ≻ is a strict partial order.
Indeed, (RI3) encodes asymmetry, while the transitivity of ≻ was established in [7], i.e., the
following inference rule can be derived from (Ax1) and (RI1)–(RI3):
If α ≻ β and β ≻ γ then α ≻ γ (20)
20
A soundness and completeness result was also established in [7] with respect to a semantics
in terms of partial orders between sets of models JαK and JβK verifying obvious seman-
tic counterparts of the axioms. Note in particular that, unlike in GPLcore≻ , the semantics
considered in [7] is not based on necessity measures.
Clearly, the axiom (Ax1) and inference rules (RI1)–(RI3) are also sound for GPL
core
≻ .
Note, however, that (RI1)–(RI3) can be formulated as axioms in GPL
core
≻ :
(Ax2) (β ≻ α ∧ χ) ∧ (α ≻ β ∧ χ)→ (β ∧ α ≻ χ)
(Ax3) (α ≻ β)→ (α
′ ≻ β′) if α→ α′ and β′ → β are tautologies
(Ax4) ¬((α ≻ β) ∧ (β ≻ α))
Further axioms are needed to capture the fact that arbitrary propositional combinations of
comparative certainty statements are allowed in GPLcore≻ . Furthermore, to capture the fact
that our semantics is based on necessity measures, we will need to impose that ≻ is the
complement of a weak order. Recall that α ∼ β stands for ¬(α ≻ β) ∨ (β ≻ α). It is then
obvious that the following formulas can be derived from (Ax1)–(Ax4) together with the
axioms from propositional logic and modus ponens:
(S1) (α ≻ β) ∨ (β ≻ α) ∨ (α ∼ β)
(S2) ¬((α ≻ β) ∧ (α ∼ β))
(S3) (α ∼ β)→ (β ∼ α)
To ensure that ∼ is transitive, we augment the relative certainty logic from [7] with the
following additional axiom:
(Ax5) (α ≻ β) ∧ (α ∼ α
′)→ (α′ ≻ β)
For K a set of GPLcore≻ formulas and Φ a GPL
core
≻ formula, we write K ⊢
core
≻ Φ to denote that
Φ can be derived from K using (Ax1)–(Ax5), modus ponens and the axioms of classical
logic. When there is no cause for confusion, we also write ⊢core≻ as ⊢. We now show some
properties of ≻ and ∼ that follow from the proposed axioms and inference rules, and which
will be useful for showing the soundness and completeness result.
Proposition 3. The following theorems hold:
⊢core≻ (α ∼ β) ∧ (β ∼ γ)→ (α ∼ γ) (21)
⊢core≻ α ∼ α (22)
⊢core≻ (α ∼ β)→ (α
′ ∼ β) if α ≡ α′ is a tautology (23)
⊢core≻ (α ≻ β) ∧ (β ∼ β
′)→ (α ≻ β′) (24)
⊢core≻ (α ≻ β ∧ χ)→ (α ≻ β) ∨ (α ≻ χ) (25)
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Proof. Eq. 21 From (S1) we know that α ∼ γ holds unless α ≻ γ or γ ≻ α holds. However,
from α ≻ γ and α ∼ β, we derive β ≻ γ using (Ax5), which leads to a contradiction
with β ∼ γ when using (S2). Similarly, from γ ≻ α and β ∼ γ, we derive β ≻ α using
(S3) and (Ax5), leading to a contradiction with α ∼ β using (S3) and (S2).
Eq. 22 From (S1) and the irreﬂexivity of ≻ we immediately obtain (22).
Eq. 23 Note that from (S1) we know that α
′ ∼ β holds unless α′ ≻ β or β ≻ α′ holds. From
α′ ≻ β and |=α ≡ α′, we can derive α ≻ β using (Ax3), which leads to a contradiction
with α ∼ β when using (S2). Similarly, from β ≻ α
′ and |=α ≡ α′, we can derive
β ≻ α using (Ax3), which leads to a contradiction with α ∼ β when using (S3) and
(S2).
Eq. 24 From (S1) we know that α ≻ β
′ holds unless α ∼ β′ or β′ ≻ α holds. From α ∼ β′
and β ∼ β′, we can derive α ∼ β using (S3) and (21), which leads to a contradiction
with α ≻ β when using (S2). From β
′ ≻ α and β ∼ β′, we can derive β ≻ α using
(S3) and (Ax5), which leads to a contradiction with α ≻ β using (Ax4).
Eq. 25 Suppose ¬(α ≻ β) ∧ ¬(α ≻ χ) holds. Then by (S1) we have
((β ≻ α) ∨ (β ∼ α)) ∧ ((χ ≻ α) ∨ (χ ∼ α))
Now suppose that α ≻ β ∧ χ were also the case. From either β ≻ α or β ∼ α we
can then derive β ≻ β ∧ χ, using respectively (20) and (Ax5). Similarly, from either
χ ≻ α or χ ∼ α we can derive χ ≻ β ∧ χ. Using (Ax3) we can derive β ≻ χ ∧ β ∧ χ
and χ ≻ β ∧ β ∧χ, which using (Ax2) gives us β ∧χ ≻ β ∧χ. Using (Ax3) we derive
a contradiction, and thus we can conclude ¬(α ≻ β ∧ χ).
Note that it follows that ∼ is an equivalence relation. Indeed, the symmetry of ∼ is expressed
in (S3), while its transitivity and reﬂexivity are expressed in (21) and (22) respectively. It
follows that the relation  corresponds to a complete preorder (or weak order) on the
language L. In contrast, when using the partial order semantics of [7], the relation ∼ is not
transitive, and property (25) does not hold, namely we do not have that α > β ∧ γ implies
one of α > β or α > γ in the comparative certainty logic of [7]. This clearly illustrates
the diﬀerence with the relative certainty logic from [7]. Axiom (Ax5) is not derivable from
(Ax1-Ax4), since the latter only ensure that ≻ is a partial order, hence in that case ∼ also
covers incomparability and is generally not transitive.
We can show the following soundness and completeness result for this extended set of
axioms w.r.t. the GPLcore≻ semantics.
Proposition 4. Let Φ and Ψ be formulas in Lcore≻ . It holds that Φ |=≻ Ψ iff Φ ⊢
core
≻ Ψ.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
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Finally, note that while we have focused on comparative necessity, in a similar way we
could develop a logic for reasoning about comparative guaranteed possibility. Among other
applications, it seems that such a logic could be useful for modelling and reasoning about
desires [52].
5.3. Axiomatizing GPL≻
In GPL≻ we can express formulas such as Nλ(α)∧ (β  α). Clearly, this formula entails
Nλ(β). To capture such inferences at the syntactic level, we extend the axiomatization of
GPLcore≻ with the following axioms:
(Ax6) Nλ(α) ∧ ¬Nλ(β)→ (α ≻ β)
(Ax7) N1(α) ≡ (α ∼ ⊤)
(Ax8) Nλ(α)→ (α ≻ ⊥)
Note that (Ax6) is equivalent toNλ(α)∧(β  α)→ Nλ(β). In addition to these axioms, we
will also use the GPL axioms (PL) (i.e. the axioms of classical logic) and (W). In particular,
for K a set of GPL≻ formulas and Φ a GPL≻ formula (or set of GPL≻ formulas), we write
K ⊢≻ Φ to denote that Φ can be derived from K using (Ax1)–(Ax8), (PL), (W) and
modus ponens.
Note (K), (N) and (D), which are axioms in GPL but not in GPL≻, can be derived as
theorems in GPL≻. To show this for (K), we prove that Nλ(α → β) ∧Nλ(α) ∧ ¬Nλ(β) is
inconsistent. By applying (Ax6) twice, we can derive (α→ β ≻ β) ∧ (α ≻ β). This can be
weakened to (α→ β ≻ α ∧ β) ∧ (α ≻ (α→ β) ∧ β) using (Ax3), from which we can derive
α ∧ (α → β) ≻ β using (Ax2). The latter formula can be weakened to β ≻ β by applying
(Ax3) again, which is inconsistent with (Ax4). The GPL axiom (N) can straightforwardly
be derived from (Ax7) and (22). Finally, (D) has to be expressed as Nλ(α) → ¬N 1
k
(¬α),
since the abbreviation Π1(α) is not used in GPL≻. We show that Nλ(α) ∧ N 1
k
(¬α) is
inconsistent. To this end, we can derive N 1
k
(⊥) using (K), (N), (W) and (PL). Using
(Ax8), this leads to ⊥ ≻ ⊥, which is inconsistent with (Ax4).
We can show the following soundness and completeness result.
Proposition 5. Let Φ and Ψ be formulas in L≻. It holds that Φ |=≻ Ψ iff Φ ⊢≻ Ψ.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
5.4. Reasoning about conditionals
There are two rather distinct traditions in the ﬁeld of non-monotonic reasoning. On
the one hand, formalisms such as answer set programming, Reiter’s default logic [53], and
Moore’s autoepistemic logic [54] allow us to explicitly make default assumptions of the form
“unless there is evidence to the contrary, assume X”. We will discuss such forms of non-
monotonic reasoning in more detail in Section 6. On the other hand, there is a large class
of approaches to reason about rules with exceptions, based on the view that in the case of
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a conﬂict, priority should be given to more speciﬁc rules: from the information that birds
generally ﬂy, penguins generally cannot ﬂy, and all penguins are birds, these approaches
allow us to derive that Tweety, who is a penguin, cannot ﬂy. In this section we show that
we can encode such exception-tolerant rules in GPLcore≻ .
Let us write α|∼β to encode the conditional “if α then generally β”. Several approaches
have been proposed to reason about such exception-tainted rules [55, 56, 57, 58]. One of
the most important results in this ﬁeld is that despite the diﬀerent intuitions underlying
these approaches, there is a consensus shared with virtually all of them about the minimal
set of conditionals of the form α|∼β that should be entailed by a given rule base R =
{α1|∼β1, ..., αn|∼βn}. This common core of conclusions is captured by the inference rules of
System P [5]:
α|∼α (Reﬂexivity)
If |=α ≡ α′ and α|∼β then α′|∼β (Left logical equivalence)
If β |= β′ and α|∼β then α|∼β′ (Right weakening)
If α|∼γ and β|∼γ then α ∨ β|∼γ (OR)
If α|∼β and α|∼γ then α ∧ β|∼γ (Weak monotony)
If α ∧ β|∼γ and α|∼β then α|∼γ (CUT)
The last two inference rules correspond to the idea of cumulativity, whereby α ∧ β|∼γ and
α|∼γ are equivalent if α|∼β is taken for granted. If we only consider conditionals α|∼β for
which α 6 |=⊥, the conclusions that System P allows us to derive from the rule base R can
be characterized using possibility theory. Speciﬁcally, let PR be the set of all possibility
measures Π for which Π(αi∧βi) > Π(αi∧¬βi) for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}. It can then be shown
[59] that α|∼β can be derived from R using the axioms of System P iﬀ Π(α∧β) > Π(α∧¬β)
for every Π ∈ PR. Moreover, it holds that Π(α∧β) > Π(α∧¬β) for the unique least speciﬁc
possibility measure (i.e., the possibility measure induced by the least speciﬁc possibility
distribution relative to a ﬁnite but suﬃciently large set of certainty levels) in PR iﬀ α|∼β is
in the rational closure of R [56], the latter being a well-known reﬁnement of System P.
This means that both System P and the rational closure can naturally be characterized
using GPLcore≻ . In particular, we associate with each conditional α|∼β the GPL
core
≻ formula
c(α|∼β), stating that Π(α ∧ β) > Π(α ∧ ¬β), or equivalently N(α→ β) > N(α→ ¬β):
c(α|∼β) = (α→ β) ≻ (α→ ¬β)
Similar as before, we ﬁnd that we can interpret ≻ as an abbreviation in the language of
GPLk, provided that k is suﬃciently large. In particular, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let c(R) = {c(αi|∼βi) | (αi|∼βi) ∈ R}. Assume that α, α1, ..., αn are con-
sistent. It holds that:
• c(R)|=kGPLc(α|∼β) iff α|∼β can be derived from R using the axioms of System P,
provided that k ≥ |R|+ 1.
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• α|∼β is in the rational closure of R iff c(α|∼β) is satisfied by the (unique) least specific
GPLk e-model of c(R), provided that k ≥ |R|.
Proof. If k ≥ |R|+1, it follows from Proposition 18 that c(R)∧¬c(α|∼β) is inconsistent, or
equivalently that c(R)|=≻c(α|∼β), iﬀ every e-model of c(R) also satisﬁes c(α|∼β). In other
words, given the result from [59], c(R)|=≻c(α|∼β) holds iﬀ α|∼β can be derived from R using
the axioms of System P.
The least speciﬁc e-model of c(R) corresponds to the least speciﬁc e-model of the pos-
sibilistic counterpart to the Z-ranking [58]. As this possibilistic counterpart corresponds to
a knowledge base with at most |R| levels, it is clear that least speciﬁc e-model of c(R) will
correspond to the rational closure of R if k ≥ |R|.
In contrast to System P, GPLcore≻ can also be used to reason about propositional combinations
of conditionals. For example, it holds that
c(a|∼b) ∨ c(a|∼c)|=≻c(a|∼b ∨ c) (26)
Indeed, using (Ax3) it follows from either of (a→ b) ≻ (a→ ¬b) and (a→ c) ≻ (a→ ¬c)
that (a→ b ∨ c) ≻ (a→ ¬(b ∨ c). Hence, we ﬁnd
(
(a→ b) ≻ (a→ ¬b)
)
∨
(
(a→ c) ≻ (a→
¬c)
)
|= (a → b ∨ c) ≻ (a → ¬(b ∨ c), which is equivalent to (26). This means that we can
use GPLcore≻ to deﬁne a logic for reasoning about conditionals. Let us deﬁne the language
Lc as the following fragment of L
core
≻ :
• If α, β ∈ L and α 6|= ⊥, then ((α→ β) ≻ (α→ ¬β)) belongs to Lc;
• If Φ and Ψ belong to Lc, then ¬Φ and Φ ∧Ψ are also in Lc.
We will refer to the corresponding logic as GPLc. Its satisfaction relation |=c is simply
deﬁned as the restriction of |=≻ to the language fragment Lc. To reason about formulas in
Lc we can rely on the axiomatization of L
core
≻ proposed in Section 5.2. Alternatively, as we
show next, we can also deﬁne a syntactic inference relation ⊢c that allows derivations to say
within the language fragment Lc. To this end, we will extend the inference rules of System
P, all of which are theorems in GPLcore≻ . In particular, it was shown in [7] that the following
System P rules, here written as GPLc formulas, can be derived from (Ax1)–(Ax3):
(OR) c(α|∼γ) ∧ c(β|∼γ)→ c(α ∨ β|∼γ)
(CM) c(α|∼β) ∧ c(α|∼γ)→ c(α ∧ β|∼γ)
(CUT) c(α ∧ β|∼γ) ∧ c(α|∼β)→ c(α|∼γ)
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the following System P rules also follow from (Ax1)–
(Ax3):
(RE) c(α|∼α), if α is consistent
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(LLE) c(α|∼β)→ c(α′|∼β), if |= (α ≡ α′)
(RW) c(α|∼β)→ c(α|∼β′), if β |= β′
In other words, all the inference rules of System P are theorems in GPLcore≻ . To enable
reasoning about propositional combinations of default rules in GPLc, we will also use the
following axioms:
(WRM) c(α|∼γ) ∧ ¬c(α|∼¬β)→ c(α ∧ β|∼γ)
(INC) c(α|∼β)→ ¬c(α|∼¬β)
Note that (INC) follows directly from (Ax4), i.e., the GPLc axiom (INC) is a theorem
in GPLcore≻ . The same holds for (WRM), which follows from Proposition ?? below. The
notation for the axiom (WRM) was introduced in [60], where a logic called NP+ is discussed,
in which disjunctions and negations can also be expressed. Note that (WRM) is similar
to, but diﬀerent from the rational monotonicity rule considered in [61]. The latter allows
to derive α ∧ β|∼γ as soon as α|∼γ holds and α|∼¬β cannot be established. In contrast,
(WRM) requires that the negation of α|∼¬β can be derived. The axiom (INC) is needed
to make inconsistencies explicit at the propositional meta-level.
For K a set of GPLc formulas and Ψ a GPLc formulas, we write K ⊢c Ψ to denote that
Ψ can be derived from K using (RE), (LLE), (RW), (OR), (CM), (CUT), (WRM),
(INC), the axioms of propositional logic and modus ponens.
Proposition 7. Let Φ and Ψ be formulas in Lc. Then Φ ⊢c Ψ iff Φ |=c Ψ.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D
A similar result was obtained in [62], where possibility theory was also used to give a
semantics to disjunctions of conditionals, albeit in a diﬀerent context. Other logics in which
propositional combinations of conditionals can be expressed include the logic NP+ from [60],
which has a semantics based on inﬁnitesimal probabilities, the approach from [63], which is
based on a three-valued semantics of conditional objects, and Lewis’ logic VA [64], whose
sphere semantics has been related to comparative possibility relations in [65] and can thus
be simulated in GPL in a similar way.
Compared to logics such as NP+ and VA, the main advantage of GPL is that we are able
to provide a more intuitive semantics. Another advantage is that GPL can be implemented
using SAT solvers in a relatively straightforward way, which should enable very eﬃcient
reasoning about default rules. Finally, embedding a logic of conditionals in GPL has the
advantage that it allows us to combine conditionals with other types of epistemic knowledge.
For example, we can use ¬Π1(β) to express that β is an abnormal situation, and, e.g., use
N1(α) → ¬Π1(β) to encode that if α has been observed then β should be considered
abnormal, which is more cautious than α|∼¬β.
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6. Non-monotonic logic programming in GPL
The ability of GPL to model limitations on the knowledge of an agent makes it a natural
framework for implementing various forms of non-monotonic reasoning. Section 5.4 already
explained how to capture reasoning with exception-tainted rules. In the following, we show
how the semantics of answer set programs can also be naturally captured in GPL. Section 6.2
then shows a close correspondence between GPL and the logic of minimal belief and negation
as failure [66]. In particular, we obtain that the notion of minimality that is required in the
latter logic is less demanding than the principle of minimal speciﬁcity in GPL.
6.1. Casting answer set programs in GPL
Consider the GPL formula Π1(a)→ N1(b). Intuitively, this formula allows us to reason
about the absence of information: as long as there is no reason to believe that a is false, we
assume that b is necessarily true. Note, however, that Π1(a) → N1(b), which is equivalent
to N 1
k
(¬a)∨N1(b), has two minimally speciﬁc e-models: the e-models π
∗
a and πb deﬁned as
follows
π∗a(ω) =
{
k−1
k
if ω |= a
1 otherwise
πb(ω) =
{
0 if ω |= ¬b
1 otherwise
Note that πb is Boolean in the sense that πb(ω) ∈ {0, 1} for every ω ∈ Ω, whereas π
∗
a is not, if
k ≥ 2. It turns out that in general, if we restrict our attention to minimally speciﬁc Boolean
e-models of GPL formulas of this type with k = 2, we obtain a semantics for reasoning
from the absence of information, which captures the stable model semantics of answer set
programs. As we shall see the condition k > 1 is crucial. If k = 1 then Π1(a) → N1(b) is
equivalent toN1(¬a)∨N1(b), which does not allow for nonmonotonicity and only corresponds
to a GPL (or more speciﬁcally MEL) translation of Kleene logic implication [67]. For the
remainder of this section, we will focus on GPL2, although all the results readily translate
to GPLk for any k ≥ 2.
Recall that an answer set program is a set of rules of the form:
a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm ∧ not c1 ∧ ... ∧ not cℓ (27)
Intuitively, this rule encodes the idea that if we have no knowledge that any of c1, ..., cℓ are
true, then whenever we can derive b1, ..., bm we will assume that one of a1, ..., an must be
true as well. As suggested in [68], we can view such a rule as a constraint on the possible
epistemic states that a given agent may have. Let Lit = At ∪ {¬a | a ∈ At} be the set of
literals in the language. Let M ⊆ Lit be such that {a,¬a} 6⊆ M for every a ∈ At . Such a
set M ⊆ Lit can intuitively be viewed as a partial model: a ∈M means that a is known to
be true, ¬a ∈ M means that a is known to be false, and a,¬a /∈ M means that the truth
value of a is unknown. The reduct PM of an answer set program P w.r.t. a partial model
M is deﬁned as follows:
PM = {a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm |M ∩ {c1, ..., cℓ} = ∅,
(a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm ∧ not c1 ∧ ... ∧ not cℓ) ∈ P}
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Note that the reduct PM is free of the negation-as-failure operator “not”. The set M is
called a model of a rule a1∨ ...∨an ← b1∧ ...∧bm iﬀ {b1, ..., bm} 6⊆M orM ∩{a1, ..., an} 6= ∅.
Furthermore, M is called a model of a set of rules PM (without negation-as-failure) if it is
a model of every rule in PM . Finally, M is called an answer set of an answer set program
P iﬀ it is the (unique) minimal model of PM w.r.t. set inclusion.
Several equivalent methods have been identiﬁed to characterize the semantics of an-
swer set programs [69]. Most of these characterizations are based on some kind of ﬁxpoint
construction. In the deﬁnition above, this is captured by the reduct, which ﬁxes the inter-
pretation of all literals under the scope of the “not” operator.
Using GPL, however, we can semantically characterize answer set programs purely in
terms of minimally speciﬁc e-models. Speciﬁcally, given an answer set program P , we let
KP be the GPL knowledge base obtained by translating each rule of the form (27) into the
following formula:
N1(b1) ∧ ... ∧N1(bm) ∧Π1(¬c1) ∧ ... ∧Π1(¬cℓ)→ N1(a1) ∨ ... ∨N1(an) (28)
In other words, the body of a rule of the form (27) is satisﬁed if the agent knows each bi
with maximal certainty and moreover the agent considers ¬cj fully possible for each j. Note
that Π1(¬cj) is equivalent to ¬N 1
2
(cj) in GPL2.
The transformation in (28) is by itself not enough, as ASP is based on the idea of forward
chaining and in particular does not allow contrapositive reasoning (e.g., from the rule a← b
and the fact ¬a we should not derive ¬b). To see how forward chaining could be enforced
using GPL, ﬁrst note that there are three ways in GPL2 in which the formula (28) can be
satisﬁed by a minimally speciﬁc e-model π of ΘP :
1. one of the meta-literals N1(bi) is not satisﬁed by π;
2. one of the meta-literals Π1(¬ci) is not satisﬁed by π, i.e., N 1
2
(ci) is satisﬁed by π;
3. one of the meta-literals N1(ai) is satisﬁed by π.
The ﬁrst case intuitively corresponds to an answer set which does not include bi, i.e., to a
situation in which the rule (27) does not apply. The third case intuitively corresponds to an
answer set in which ai has been included to make the rule (27) satisﬁed, i.e., to a situation
in which ai has been derived using (non-deterministic) forward chaining. The second case,
however, intuitively corresponds to a contrapositive inference, i.e., (27) has been satisﬁed by
making ci true. The latter inference is not allowed in ASP and the second case should thus
be excluded. To this end, we take advantage of the fact that it is only in the second case
that certainty degrees other than 0 or 1 are needed. Note that here we do not use degrees for
modelling uncertainty, but intuitively for diﬀerentiating between literals that are assumed
to be true and literals that can eﬀectively be derived. In particular, it turns out that answer
sets correspond to the minimally speciﬁc e-models of ΘP in which only the certainty degrees
0 and 1 occur. Formally, the requirement that only these certainty degrees occur is encoded
by the GPL formula Φ, deﬁned as follows:
Φ=
∧
a∈At
N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)) (29)
28
The formula Φ expresses that for every atom a, the agent is either fully certain about the
truth value of a (in which case N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) holds) or the agent is completely ignorant
about a (in which case Π1(a) ∧ Π1(¬a) holds). It turns out that the answer sets of P
correspond to the minimally speciﬁc e-models of ΘP that satisfy Φ. In particular, we have
the following correspondence.
Proposition 8. Let P be an answer set program and let KP be the corresponding GPL2
knowledge base. It holds that P has a consistent answer set iff
KP |=b
∧
a∈At
N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)) (30)
Furthermore, it holds that l is included in at least one answer set of P iff
KP |=b
( ∧
a∈At
N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a))
)
∧N1(l) (31)
Finally, it holds that l is included in all answer sets of P iff
KP |=c
( ∧
a∈At
N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a))
)
→ N1(l) (32)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix E.
Note that this result does not hold in GPL1. Indeed, for k = 1, like for instance in [28], we
have that
∧
a∈At N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)) is a tautology. This explains why a
similar characterization is not possible in autoepistemic logic, or other modal logics which
rely on Boolean certainty degrees only. In contrast, equilibrium logic [70] does allow a
similar characterization, by using a Boolean valuation in two worlds (called here and there)
instead of intermediary certainty degrees. The advantage of GPL over equilibrium logic is
that the epistemic interpretation of formulas is explicit, which make them easier to interpret
intuitively (although this comes at the cost of a less concise syntax); we refer to [8] for
a more detailed discussion on the relation between GPL and equilibrium logic. Note that
while Farin˜as et al. [71] have proposed a characterization of equilibrium logic in modal logic,
this characterization does not highlight the intuitive meaning of equilibrium logic formulas,
from an epistemic reasoning point of view. Recently, the same authors [72] have proposed
an epistemic equilibrium logic. Again, however, the aim of this logic is not to provide an
intuitive method for epistemic reasoning, but to generalize epistemic speciﬁcations [73, 74],
a generalization of ASP which allows a new type of literal K l in the body of rules, intuitively
stating that l is true in all answer sets.
6.2. Logic of minimal belief and negation as failure
The characterization of ASP using GPL easily allows us to generalize the stable model
semantics to a larger class of logic programs. For example, we could readily provide a
semantics for disjunctions of ASP rules, we could allow negation as failure to appear in the
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head of a rule, or use expressions of the formN1(α) where α can be an arbitrary propositional
expressions instead of only a literal (see [68] for a more elaborate discussion on the latter
point).
There are a number of existing logics which can similarly be used to provide a semantics
for negation-as-failure in a more general setting. One of the simplest and earliest of these
logics is Lifschitz’ logic of minimal belief and negation as failure (MBNF) [66]. The language
of this logic is the usual propositional language, extended with two modalities B and “not ”.
The semantics are deﬁned w.r.t. triples of the form (ω, Sb, Sn), where ω ∈ Ω is a propositional
interpretation and Sb, Sn ⊆ Ω are sets of propositional interpretations:
• For an atom a, (ω, Sb, Sn)|=MBNFa iﬀ ω |= a;
• (ω, Sb, Sn)|=MBNF¬ψ iﬀ (ω, S
b, Sn) 6 |=MBNFψ;
• (ω, Sb, Sn)|=MBNFψ ∧ φ iﬀ (ω, S
b, Sn)|=MBNFψ and (ω, S
b, Sn)|=MBNFφ;
• (ω, Sb, Sn)|=MBNFBψ iﬀ (ω
′, Sb, Sn)|=MBNFψ for every ω
′ ∈ Sb (i.e., Sb ⊆ JψK if ψ is
a propositional formula);
• (ω, Sb, Sn)|=MBNFnotψ iﬀ there exists an ω
′ ∈ Sn such that (ω′, Sb, Sn) 6 |=MBNFψ
(i.e., Sn 6⊆ JψK if ψ is a propositional formula)
Intuitively, Bψ is true if ψ is known to be true, i.e., we can think of Sb as the set of worlds
that the agent considers possible. Intuitively notψ is true unless ψ is known to be true,
where we instead consider Sn as the set of worlds that the agent considers possible. The
satisfaction relation |= does not require any constraints on the relationship between Sb and
Sn, although as we will see below, in models we will have that Sb = Sn. So, Sb is used to
evaluate the “B” modalities and Sn is used to evaluate the “not” modalities. The use of
two separate epistemic states can thus be thought of as a technical trick to encode a notion
of minimality. As usual, ψ ∨ φ is seen as an abbreviation of ¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬φ) and ψ → φ as an
abbreviation of ¬(ψ ∧ ¬φ). Moreover, (ω, Sb, Sn) satisﬁes a set of MNBF formulas K iﬀ it
satisﬁes every formula in that set. A structure (ω, S) is called a model of a formula ψ iﬀ
1. (ω, S, S)|=MBNFψ; and
2. (ω′, S ′, S) 6 |=MBNFψ for any S
′ ⊃ S and any propositional interpretation ω′
This second condition essentially plays a similar role to the notion of minimal speciﬁcity
in GPL (and the notion of h-minimality in equilibrium logic). Note that the fact that
modalities can be nested in MBNF does not really increase its expressive power, as e.g.,
B(B(ψ)) and B(ψ) are equivalent (i.e., are satisﬁed by the same triples). Let us now
consider the restriction of the language of MBNF to formulas without nested modalities, in
which all atomic formulas occur within the scope of a modality. Let us refer to this fragment
as MBNF1. This fragment is particularly interesting, because it can be used to deﬁne the
semantics of answer set programming, in a way which is similar to the characterization in
GPL from Proposition 8. In particular, consider an ASP rule of the following form
a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm ∧ not c1 ∧ ... ∧ not cℓ
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The corresponding formula in MBNF1 is given by
B(b1) ∧ ... ∧ B(bm) ∧ not (c1) ∧ ... ∧ not (cℓ)→ B(a1) ∨ ... ∨ B(an)
Lifschitz showed the following result.
Proposition 9. [66] Let P be an answer set program and let K be the corresponding MNBF
knowledge base. If holds that a set of literals M is a (consistent) answer set of P iff there
exists a model (ω, S) of K such that S = JMK.
We will now show that MBNF1 is related to, but diﬀerent from GPL2. In particular, with
each MBNF1 knowledge base Θ, the corresponding GPL knowledge base g(Θ) is obtained
by replacing each occurrence of B(α) by N1(α) and each occurrence of not (α) by Π1(¬α).
Note that for MBNF1 formulas, we can identify models with sets S ⊆ Ω since whenever
(ω, S) is also a model of an MBNF1 formula, then (ω
′, S) is a model for any interpretation
ω′. For the same reason, we will write (Sb, Sn) instead of (ω, Sb, Sn) when the choice of ω is
irrelevant.
In the following, for any S ⊆ Ω, we deﬁne the possibility distribution πS as πS(ω) = 1 if
ω ∈ S and πS(ω) = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 10. Let Θ be an MBNF1 knowledge base and let g(Θ) be the corresponding
GPL2 knowledge base. Let S ⊆ Ω. Then (S, S)|=MBNFΘ iff πS |=GPL g(Θ).
Proof. For any propositional formula α, we have that (S, S)|=MBNFB(α) iﬀ α is true in
every ω ∈ S iﬀ πS |=GPL N1(α). Similarly, we have (S, S)|=MBNFnot (α) iﬀ α is false in
some ω ∈ S iﬀ πS |=GPL Π1(¬α). It follows that (S, S)|=MBNFΘ iﬀ πS |=GPL g(Θ).
Moreover, if πS is a minimally speciﬁc e-model of g(Θ) then S is obviously a model of
Θ. However, we do not have that every model S of an MBNF1 formula Θ corresponds to a
minimally speciﬁc e-model of g(Θ), as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 5. We consider an example with only one atom a and we denote Ω = {ωa, ω¬a},
where ωa is the interpretation which makes a true and ω¬a the interpretation which makes a
false. Let ψ = B(a)∨not (a). Then g(ψ) = N1(a)∨Π1(¬a) has only one minimally specific
e-model π, defined by π(ωa) = π(ω¬a) = 1. Accordingly, S1 = {ωa, ω¬a} is a model of ψ;
indeed we have (S1, S1) |=MBNF not (a) and S1 does not have any supersets since ωa and ω¬a
are the only interpretations. However, we show that S2 = {ωa} is also a model of ψ. First
note that (S2, S2)|=MBNFB(a) hence we already have (S2, S2)|=MBNFψ. To show that S2 is
a model, it suffices to show that (S1, S2) 6 |=MBNFψ for the only superset S1, which is easy
to verify. Indeed S1 is not in JaK, which violates B(a), and S2 = JaK, which violates not (a).
This means that the notion of minimal speciﬁcity in GPL is more demanding than the
notion of minimality imposed on models in MBNF. In [8], we obtained a similar result when
comparing GPL to equilibrium logic [70]. This discrepancy especially seems to arise for
theories which correspond to logic programs with negation-as-failure in the head. It is well-
known that in the presence of negation-as-failure in the head, most semantics that cover
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such cases lead to answer sets for which minimality no longer holds. While this has been
advocated in e.g., [75] as a useful feature to encode particular constructs, such as inclusive
disjunction, this behaviour remains somewhat counter-intuitive in a setting where minimal
commitment is one of the main guiding principles.
The encoding of MBNF1 in GPL is similar in spirit to the encoding of equilibrium logic
that we proposed in [8]. In particular, the GPL encoding of an equilibrium logic theory
is also such that (some) stable models correspond to those minimally speciﬁc e-models π
in which π(ω) ∈ {0, 1} for each ω ∈ Ω. However, the encoding of MBNF1 is considerably
more intuitive. This is a consequence of the fact that the modalities in MBNF have a clear
epistemic ﬂavor, which does not seem to be the case for the connectives in equilibrium logic.
7. Computational complexity
In this section, we will consider the computational complexity of the main reasoning tasks
for GPL. The modalities ∆λ, ∇λ, ∆
X
λ , ∇
X
λ were introduced in Section 4 as abbreviations of
formulas that only contain modalities of the formNλ. However, without these abbreviations,
formulas may be exponentially longer, and as the computational complexity of reasoning
tasks is expressed in function of the size of the formulas in the knowledge base, this has
an impact on the complexity results. In other words, while these modalities have been
introduced as abbreviations, they are not considered part of the language of GPL for the
complexity results. We then also consider the variants GPL∆ and GPL∆R , in which these
modalities are assumed to be included in the language:
GPL formulas are formulas in which all modalities are of the form Nλ or Πλ.
GPL∆ formulas are formulas in which also modalities of the form∆λ and ∇λ are allowed.
GPL∆R formulas are formulas in which moreover modalities of the form ∆
X
λ and ∇
X
λ are
allowed.
Table 2 provides an overview of the complexity results that we will establish. In addition to
the results from Table 2, we will also show that satisﬁability checking in GPLcore≻ and GPL≻
are NP-complete (and thus that entailment checking is coNP-complete), but the brave and
cautious inference relations will not be considered in this case, as the notion of minimal
speciﬁcity is not well-deﬁned for these logics (e.g. a ≻ ⊥ does not have a minimally speciﬁc
model).
Recall that a decision problem is in ΣPi (i > 1) if it can be solved in polynomial time
on a non-deterministic Turing machine using a ΣPi−1-oracle, where Σ
P
1 = NP. A decision
problem is in ΠPi if its complement is in Σ
P
i . A decision problem is in Θ
P
2 if it can be solved
in polynomial time on a deterministic Turing machine, by making a logarithmic number of
calls to an NP-oracle.
7.1. Complexity of reasoning about GPL formulas
Proposition 11. The problem of deciding whether a GPL formula is satisfiable is NP-
complete (w.r.t. the size of the formula).
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Table 2: Overview of the complexity results.
|= |=b |=c
GPL coNP ΣP2 Π
P
2
GPL∆ ΘP2 Σ
P
2 Π
P
2
GPL∆R Π
P
3 Σ
P
4 Π
P
4
Proof. Hardness follows straightforwardly from the NP-completeness of satisﬁability in propo-
sitional logic. In particular, note that the propositional formula α is satisﬁable iﬀ the GPL
formula Π1(α) is satisﬁable.
We now propose an NP procedure for checking the satisﬁability of an arbitrary GPL
formula Φ. Each GPL formula Φ is equivalent to a disjunction of meta-terms, and it is
suﬃcient that one of these terms is satisﬁable. In polynomial time, we can guess such a
term:
Nλ1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nλn(αn) ∧Πµ1(β1) ∧ ... ∧Πµm(βm) (33)
We know that Nλ1(α1)∧ ...∧Nλn(αn) has a unique least speciﬁc e-model π if α1 ∧ ...∧αn is
satisﬁable. All that we need to check is whether this is the case, and whether Π(βi) ≥ µi for
each i, with Π the possibility measure induced by π. In other words, there are two conditions
which we need to check. First, the following formula needs to be consistent:
α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn (34)
Second, to check whether Π(βi) ≥ µi in the least speciﬁc model of Nλ1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nλn(αn),
we need to verify that βi has a model ω such that ω |= αj holds for all j where λj ≥ ν(θ).
In other words, we need to verify for each βi that the following formula is consistent:∧
{αi |λi ≥ ν(θ)} ∧ βj (35)
To check satisﬁability in NP, when we guess the term (33), we can also guess an in-
terpretation for each of these SAT instances and verify that they are indeed models of the
corresponding propositional formulas.
Corollary 1. The problem of deciding whether Φ |= Ψ, with Φ and Ψ GPL formulas, is
coNP-complete.
Proof. This follows immediately from the observation that Φ |= Ψ holds iﬀ Φ ∧ ¬Ψ is not
satisﬁable.
From the proof it is immediately clear that the same complexity results hold in the case
of MEL, i.e., when only the certainty levels 0 and 1 are used. In other words, there is no
penalty, in terms of computational complexity, for allowing more certainty levels.
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The proof of Proposition 11 suggests a way to reason with GPL formulas using standard
SAT solvers. In particular, let Φ be a GPL formula in which no negations occur at the
meta-level. Since |=GPLNλ(α∧ β) ≡ Nλ(α)∧Nλ(β), we can also assume w.l.o.g. that every
meta-literal of the form Nλ(α) is such that α is a disjunction of literals and that every
meta-literal of the form Πλ(α) is such that α is a conjunction of literals. Let f(Φ) be the
propositional formula which is obtained from Φ by replacing every meta-literal of the form
Nλ(α) by a fresh atom a(α, λ) and every meta-literal of the form Πλ(α) by a fresh atom
b(α, λ). The SAT instance Θ corresponding with Φ contains the formula f(Φ) as well as the
following formulas, involving fresh atomic formulas of the form x(β,µ), for each meta-literal
Πµ(β). Speciﬁcally, for each meta-literal of the form Πµ(β) we add:
b(β, µ)→ a
(β,µ)
1 ∧ ... ∧ a
(β,µ)
n ∧ ¬b
(β,µ)
1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬b
(β,µ)
m (36)
where we assume β=a1 ∧ ... ∧ an ∧ ¬b1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬bm. Furthermore for each meta-literal of the
form Nλ(α) such that λ ≥ ν(µ) we add:
a(α, λ) ∧ b(β, µ)→ c
(β,µ)
1 ∨ ... ∨ c
(β,µ)
r ∨ ¬d
(β,µ)
1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬d
(β,µ)
s (37)
where we assume α=c1 ∨ ... ∨ cr ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ds. Note that the formulas (36) and (37) are
added to check the condition that the formula (35) has to be satisﬁable for each meta-literal
of the form Πµ(β) in the chosen meta-term. The other condition that we need to check is
(34), which we can do by adding the following formulas for each meta-literal of the form
Nλ(α):
a(α, λ)→ c1 ∨ ... ∨ cr ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ds (38)
where we again assume that α=c1 ∨ ... ∨ cr ∨ ¬d1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ds.
The following example illustrates the proposed reduction to SAT.
Example 6. Consider the following GPLk formula for k = 4:
Φ = N1(x ∨ y) ∧N 3
4
(¬y) ∧N 2
4
(¬x ∨ z) ∧ (Π 3
4
(¬z) ∨Π 1
4
(x))
The resulting SAT instance Θ contains the following propositional formulas:
a(x ∨ y, 1) ∧ a(¬y, 3
4
)∧a(¬x ∨ z, 2
4
) ∧ (b(¬z, 3
4
) ∨ b(x, 1
4
)) (39)
b(¬z, 3
4
)→ ¬z(¬z,
3
4
) (40)
b(x, 1
4
)→ x(x,
1
4
) (41)
a(x ∨ y, 1) ∧ b(¬z, 3
4
)→ x(¬z,
3
4
) ∨ y(¬z,
3
4
) (42)
a(¬y, 3
4
) ∧ b(¬z, 3
4
)→ ¬y(¬z,
3
4
) (43)
a(¬x ∨ z, 2
4
) ∧ b(¬z, 3
4
)→ ¬x(¬z,
3
4
) ∨ z(¬z,
3
4
) (44)
a(x ∨ y, 1) ∧ b(x, 1
4
)→ x(x,
1
4
) ∨ y(x,
1
4
) (45)
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a(x ∨ y, 1)→ x ∨ y (46)
a(¬y, 3
4
)→ ¬y (47)
a(¬x ∨ z, 2
4
)→ ¬x ∨ z (48)
Recall that expressions such as a(x ∨ y, 1) and z(¬z,
3
4
) are viewed as atomic formulas. From
(39) we know that the atomic formulas a(x ∨ y, 1), a(¬y, 3
4
) and a(¬x ∨ z, 2
4
) all need to be
true, as well as b(¬z, 3
4
) or b(x, 1
4
). However, from (40), together with (42)–(44) it follows
that b(¬z, 3
4
) cannot be satisfied in any model of Θ. This corresponds to the observation that
the meta-term N1(x ∨ y) ∧N 3
4
(¬y) ∧N 2
4
(¬x ∨ z) ∧Π 3
4
(¬z) is not satisfiable. On the other
hand, the meta-term N1(x∨y)∧N 3
4
(¬y)∧N 2
4
(¬x∨z)∧Π 1
4
(x) is satisfiable, and accordingly,
it can readily be verified that Θ has a model in which the atom b(x, 1
4
) is true.
Proposition 12. Let Φ be a GPL formula and let Θ be the associated SAT instance, con-
structed using the method explained above. It holds that Φ is satisfiable iff Θ is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose Φ has an e-model π. Then π satisﬁes some meta-term φ of the form (33).
We deﬁne a partial interpretation ω as follows: ω |= a(α, λ) iﬀ the meta-term Nλ(α) appears
in φ and ω |= ¬a(α, λ) otherwise; similarly ω |= b(α, λ) iﬀ the meta-term Πλ(α) appears in
φ and ω |= ¬b(α, λ) otherwise. Clearly, ω satisﬁes f(Φ). It remains to be shown that ω can
be extended to an interpretation of all atomic formulas appearing in Θ, such that (36)–(38)
are satisﬁed. However, the existence of such an extension follows directly from the fact that
the formulas (35) and (34) are satisﬁable if π is an e-model of the meta-term φ.
Conversely, if Θ has a model ω it is clear that there is some meta-term φ of the form (33)
such that ω |= a(α, λ) for every meta-literal Nλ(α) appearing in φ and ω |= b(α, λ) for every
meta-literal Πλ(α) appearing in φ. As in the proof of Proposition 11 we ﬁnd that φ has an
e-model iﬀ the formulas (35)–(34) are satisﬁed, and this follows straightforwardly from the
fact that ω satisﬁes (36)–(38).
As already follows from the results in Section 6, reasoning about minimally speciﬁc e-
models is more expensive than reasoning about what is true for all e-models of a GPL
knowledge base. This stands in contrast to standard possibilistic logic, where both notions
of entailment coincide.
Proposition 13. Let Φ and Ψ be two GPL formulas. The problem of checking whether
Φ |=c Ψ is Π
P
2 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
Proof. hardness Consider the following QBF formula:
ψ=∀x1, ..., xn . ∃y1, ..., ym . φ(x1, ..., xn, y1, ..., ym)
In the following, we will abbreviate such formulas as ∀X∃Y . φ(X, Y ) where X =
{x1, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, ..., ym}. We show that checking the validity of ψ can be
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reduced to the problem of checking whether Φ |=c Ψ for Φ and Ψ GPL formulas.
Speciﬁcally, we choose Φ and Ψ as follows:
Φ =
(
N1(x1) ∨N1(¬x1)
)
∧ ... ∧
(
N1(xn) ∨N1(¬xn)
)
Ψ = Π1(φ(x1, ..., xn, y1, ..., ym))
Let π : Ω→ [0, 1] be a minimally speciﬁc e-model of Ψ. Let us deﬁne L ⊆ {x1, ..., xn,
¬x1, ...,¬xn} as the set of literals that are known to be true in the epistemic state π:
L = {xi | π |= N1(xi)} ∪ {¬xi | π |= N1(¬xi)}
It is clear, by deﬁnition of Ψ, that for every xi either π |= N1(xi) or π |= N1(¬xi), and
as a result either xi ∈ L or (¬xi) ∈ L. It is also clear, by construction of L, that xi
and ¬xi cannot both be in L. In other words L deﬁnes a propositional interpretation
over {x1, ..., xn}. Conversely, each propositional interpretation over {x1, ..., xn} will
correspond to some minimally speciﬁc e-model of Ψ.
Because π was assumed to be minimally speciﬁc, every interpretation ω which is con-
sistent with L will be such that π(ω) = 1. In particular, if there exists a model ω of
φ(x1, ..., xn, y1, ..., ym) which is compatible with L, it will satisfy π(ω) = 1 and thus
π |= Π1(φ(x1, ..., xn, y1, ..., ym)).
The QBF ψ is valid if and only if such a model ω exists for every choice of L. In other
words, we have that ψ is valid iﬀ Φ |=c Ψ.
membership Follows from the membership result in Proposition 15 below.
To characterize the complexity of brave reasoning, note that Φ |=c Ψ iﬀ it is not the case
that Φ |=b ¬Ψ. Hence we immediately get the following result.
Corollary 2. Let Φ and Ψ be two GPL formulas. The problem of checking whether Φ |=b Ψ
is ΣP2 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
Given this complexity result, it is clear that no polynomial transformation to SAT will allow
us to check Φ |=c Ψ or Φ |=b Ψ, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. However, it is
straightforward to reduce these entailment queries to QBFs, using a translation similar to
the proposed SAT translation for checking the consistency of GPL formulas. In this way, we
can use QBF solvers for reasoning about the minimally speciﬁc models of a GPL knowledge
base.
7.2. Complexity of reasoning about GPL∆ formulas
We now consider GPL∆ formulas, i.e., formulas in which also meta-literals of the form
∆λ(α) and ∇λ(α) can occur.
Proposition 14. The problem of deciding whether Φ |= Ψ, for Φ and Ψ two GPL∆ formulas,
is ΘP2 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
36
Proof. hardness A standard ΘP2 -complete problem is the following. Let φ1, ..., φn be propo-
sitional formulas. Decide whether the smallest i for which φi is unsatisﬁable is an odd
number.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that n is odd (as otherwise we could simply
omit φn). Now consider the following GPL
∆ formula:
Ψ=¬Π1(φ1) ∨ (Π1(φ1) ∧Π1(φ2) ∧ ¬Π1(φ3))
∨ ... ∨ (Π1(φ1) ∧ ... ∧Π1(φn−1) ∧ ¬Π1(φn))
We show that∆1(⊤) |= Ψ iﬀ the smallest i for which φi is unsatisﬁable is odd. Clearly,
∆1(⊤) has exactly one e-model, which is the possibility distribution π
∗ for which every
world is fully possible, i.e., π∗(ω) = 1 for every ω ∈ Ω. For a propositional formula φ,
we then have Π∗(φ) = 1 iﬀ JφK 6= ∅. In other words, π∗ will be an e-model of Ψ iﬀ φ1
is not satisﬁable, or φ1 and φ2 are satisﬁable but not φ3, etc.
membership It is well-known that the class ΘP2 coincides with the class of decision prob-
lems which can be solved in polynomial time on a deterministic Turing machine by
using a polynomial number of parallel queries to an NP-oracle, i.e., such that the re-
sult of one query to the NP-oracle cannot be used to formulate another query to the
NP-oracle [76]. Surprisingly, allowing two rounds of parallel queries does not lead to
an increased complexity ([77], Theorem 9). We will show that Φ |= Ψ can be decided
in this way, thus proving membership in ΘP2 .
Since Φ |= Ψ holds iﬀ Φ∧¬Ψ is unsatisﬁable, it is suﬃcient to show that satisﬁability
checking of GPL∆ formulas is in ΘP2 . Let Ψ be a GPL
∆ formula. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that no implications occur in Ψ and that all negations occur
inside a modality, i.e., the meta-literals in Ψ are connected using conjunction and
disjunction only.
Assume that the meta-literals occurring in Ψ are:
N 1
k
(α11), ...,N 1
k
(α1n1),N 2k
(α21), ...,N 2
k
(α2n2), ...,N1(α
k
1), ...,N1(α
k
nk
)
Π 1
k
(β11), ...,Π 1
k
(β1m1),Π 2k
(β21), ...,Π 2
k
(β2m2), ...,Π1(β
k
1 ), ...,Π1(β
k
mk
)
∆ 1
k
(γ11), ...,∆ 1
k
(γ1p1),∆ 2k
(γ21), ...,∆ 2
k
(γ2p2), ...,∆1(γ
k
1 ), ...,∆1(γ
k
pk
)
∇ 1
k
(δ11), ...,∇ 1
k
(δ1r1),∇ 2k
(δ21), ...,∇ 2
k
(δ2r2), ...,∇1(δ
k
1), ...,∇1(δ
k
rk
)
Using a ﬁrst round of parallel calls to an NP-oracle, we check γui |= α
v
j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ pu,
1 ≤ j ≤ nv, and u+ v ≥ k + 1. Note that the number of calls to the oracle is at most
quadratic in the number of meta-literals appearing in Ψ.
Using the result of these oracle calls, we can decide the satisﬁability of Ψ in NP, i.e.,
by making one additional call to the NP-oracle, as follows. Note that Ψ is equivalent
to a disjunction of meta-terms. In polynomial time we may guess such a meta-term,
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of the following form:
Θ=Nv1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(αn) ∧Πw1(β1) ∧ ... ∧Πwm(βm)
∧∆u1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧∆up(γp) ∧∇z1(δ1) ∧ ... ∧∇zr(δr)
We will further reﬁne the meta-literals of the formΠwi(βi) and∇zi(δi) in Θ. To reﬁne a
meta-literal of the formΠwi(βi) we need to replace βi by a more restrictive formula. To
this end, for each βi we guess a speciﬁc model ωβi ∈ JβiK, and we deﬁne β
∗
i =
∧
ωβi |=l
l,
i.e., β∗i is chosen such that Jβ
∗
i K = {ωβi}. It follows that |=GPLΠwi(β
∗
i ) ≡∆wi(β
∗
i ).
To reﬁne a meta-literal of the form ∇zi(δi), we need to replace δi with a less restrictive
formula. In particular, we guess a world ωδi /∈ JδiK and choose the formula δ
∗
i such
that Jδ∗i K = Ω \ {ωδi}. It then holds that |=GPL∇zi(δ
∗
i ) ≡ Nzi(δ
∗
i ). Note that the size
of the formulas β∗i and δ
∗
i is linear in the number of literals, hence we can indeed guess
these formulas in polynomial time.
Clearly, the term Θ is satisﬁable iﬀ such reﬁnements can be found that make the
following term Θ∗ satisﬁable
Θ∗=Nv1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(αn) ∧∆w1(β
∗
1) ∧ ... ∧∆wm(β
∗
m)
∧∆u1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧∆up(γp) ∧Nz1(δ
∗
1) ∧ ... ∧Nzr(δ
∗
r )
Let π∗ be the most speciﬁc possibility distribution satisfying
∆w1(β
∗
1) ∧ ... ∧∆wm(β
∗
m) ∧∆u1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧∆up(γp)
and let π∗ be the least speciﬁc possibility distribution satisfying
Nv1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(αn) ∧Nz1(δ
∗
1) ∧ ... ∧Nzr(δ
∗
r )
If is clear that every possibility distribution π from Pk satisfying π∗(ω) ≤ π(ω) ≤ π
∗(ω)
is an e-model of Θ∗. To complete the proof, we need to show that it can be checked
in polynomial time whether such a possibility distribution π exists. This is the case
exactly when α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn ∧ δ
∗
1 ∧ .... ∧ δ
∗
r is satisﬁable, and the following entailment
relations are valid:
• β∗i |= αj for every i, j such that wi ≥ ν(vj)
• β∗i |= δ
∗
j for every i, j such that wi ≥ ν(zj)
• γi |= αj for every i, j such that ui ≥ ν(vj)
• γi |= δ
∗
j for every i, j such that ui ≥ ν(zj)
To verify satisﬁability in NP (given the result of the ﬁrst round of calls to the oracle),
we can guess the term Θ∗ and at the same time guess a model of α1∧...∧αn∧δ
∗
1∧....∧δ
∗
r .
We can use that model to verify the satisﬁability of α1∧ ...∧αn∧δ
∗
1∧ ....∧δ
∗
r . Moreover,
the entailment relations of the form γi |= αj can be veriﬁed by looking up the result
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of the ﬁrst round of calls to the NP oracle. To check β∗i |= αj, since β
∗ only has one
model wβi it suﬃces to check whether αj is true in that model, which can clearly be
done in polynomial time. Similarly, β∗i |= δ
∗
j can be decided in this way. In fact, in
the latter case it suﬃces to check that wβi 6= wδj . Finally, to check γi |= δ
∗
j , we can
equivalently check ¬δ∗j |= ¬γi. Since ¬δ
∗
j has a unique model wδj it suﬃces to check
that γi is false in this model.
Thus we ﬁnd that allowing the ∆ modality causes a jump in complexity. It should
be noted, however, that this increased complexity is the result of how N and ∆ interact.
In particular, the NP-completeness result from Proposition 11 could straightforwardly be
adapted to a logic where only ∆ modalities are allowed, by taking advantage of the duality
expressed in (15).
Proposition 15. Let Φ and Ψ be two GPL∆ formulas. The problem of checking whether
Φ |=c Ψ is Π
P
2 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
Proof. hardness Follows immediately from Proposition 13.
membership We now present a ΣP2 algorithm for checking that Ψ is false in at least one
minimally speciﬁc e-model of Φ.
The GPL formula Φ is equivalent to a disjunction of meta-terms. In polynomial time,
we can guess such a meta-term. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 14, without
loss of generality, we can assume that the only meta-literals which occur in this meta-
term are of the form Nλ1(α1) and ∆µ1(β1), by reﬁning any meta-literals of the form
Πλ1(α1) and ∇µ1(β1). Assume that we guess a meta-term of the following form:
Nλ1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nλn(αn) ∧∆µ1(β1) ∧ ... ∧∆µm(βm) (49)
Using an NP-oracle we can check that this formula is consistent, verifying that α1 ∧
... ∧ αn is consistent, and that βi |= αj whenever µi ≥ ν(λj). If the meta-term is
consistent, it has a unique least speciﬁc e-model π1, which is the least speciﬁc e-model
ofNλ1(α1)∧ ...∧Nλn(αn), noting that the latter corresponds to a standard possibilistic
logic base.
Using the NP-oracle we can check that β is false in π1. In particular:
• a meta-literal Nδ1(γ1) is satisﬁed by π1 iﬀ {αi |λi ≥ δ1} |= γ1;
• a meta-literal Πδ1(γ1) is falsiﬁed by π1 iﬀ {αi |λi ≥ ν(δ1)} |= ¬γ1;
• a meta-literal ∆δ1(γ1) is satisﬁed by π1 iﬀ γ1 |= {αi |λi ≥ ν(δ1)};
• a meta-literal ∇δ1(γ1) is falsiﬁed by π1 iﬀ ¬γ1 |= {αi |λi ≥ δ1}.
What remains to be veriﬁed is that there does not exist another consistent meta-term
which is an implicant of Φ and which has a least speciﬁc e-model π2 that is strictly
less speciﬁc than π1.
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The check this, we deﬁne a GPL∆ knowledge base Φ′ as follows. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that Φ is in negation normal form and in particular that
there are no occurrences of negation or implication outside the modalities. Starting
from Φ, for each meta-literal Nδ(γ) that occurs, we test whether
Nλ1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nλn(αn) |= Nδ(γ) (50)
If this is not the case, no e-model of Nδ(γ) can be less speciﬁc than π1; we then replace
Nδ(γ) by ⊥. Furthermore, for each meta-literal ∇δ(γ) which occurs, we test whether
¬γ∧¬
∧
{αi |λi ≥ δ} is consistent. If not, we ﬁnd that no e-model of ∇δ(γ) can be less
speciﬁc than π1, and we replace∇δ(γ) by⊥. If, on the other hand, ¬γ∧¬
∧
{αi |λi ≥ δ}
is consistent, then we replace the meta-literal ∇δ(γ) by ∇δ(γ ∨
∧
{αi |λi ≥ δ}), since
the minimally speciﬁc e-models of the latter GPL formula are exactly those minimally
speciﬁc e-models of ∇δ(γ) that are less speciﬁc than π1. Note that the resulting
knowledge base Φ′ is consistent, and in particular that (49) is an implicant of Φ′.
By replacing a meta-literal Nδ(γ) or ∇δ(γ), we potentially reduce the set of e-models
of the knowledge base. However, by construction, none of these e-models can be less
speciﬁc than π1. Moreover, each minimally speciﬁc e-model of Φ
′ is either equal to π1
or strictly less speciﬁc than π1. Therefore, we ﬁnally test whether Φ
′ |= Nλ1(α1)∧ ...∧
Nλn(αn). If this is the case, then none of the e-models of Φ
′, and by extension of Φ,
can be less speciﬁc than π1. On the other hand, if this is not the case, then Φ
′ has an
e-model which is not a reﬁnement of π (since any reﬁnement of π1 is also an e-model
of Nλ1(α1)∧ ...∧Nλn(αn)). By construction, Φ
′ then has an e-model which is strictly
less speciﬁc than π1, which means that the guess in (49) did not induce a minimally
speciﬁc e-model of Φ.
Corollary 3. Let Φ and Ψ be two GPL∆ formulas. The problem of checking whether Φ |=b Ψ
is ΣP2 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
7.3. Complexity of reasoning about GPL∆R formulas
Next we consider the complexity of reasoning in the presence of the restricted guaranteed
possibility modality.
Proposition 16. The problem of deciding whether Φ |= Ψ, for Φ and Ψ two GPL∆R formulas,
is ΠP3 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
Proof. We will prove that checking the satisﬁability of a GPL∆R formula is Σ
P
3 -complete,
from which the stated result readily follows.
Hardness Let X ∪ Y ∪ Z be a partition of the set of atomic formulas. We can show that
checking the validity of the QBF Ψ=∃X∀Y ∃Z . φ(X, Y, Z) is equivalent to checking
whether the following formula is satisﬁable:∧
x∈X
(
N1(x) ∨N1(¬x)
)
∧∆Y1 (⊤) ∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z)) (51)
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Indeed, this formula is equivalent to a disjunction of meta-terms, each of which cor-
responds to an interpretation of the variables in X. Let X1 ∪X2 be a partition of X
and let us consider the corresponding implicant of (51):( ∧
x∈X1
N1(x)
)
∧
( ∧
x∈X2
N1(¬x)
)
∧∆Y1 (⊤) ∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z))
This is equivalent to
∆Y1 (⊤) ∧N1
(
φ(X, Y, Z) ∧ (
∧
x∈X1
x) ∧ (
∧
x∈X2
¬x)
)
The latter formula is satisﬁable iﬀ every truth assignment of the variables in Y can
be extended to a model of φ(X, Y, Z) ∧ (
∧
x∈X1
x) ∧ (
∧
x∈X2
¬x). Clearly this means
that (51) is satisﬁable iﬀ the QBF Ψ is valid. This means that satisﬁability checking
in GPL∆R is Σ
P
3 -hard, from which it follows that entailment checking is Π
P
3 -hard.
Membership We provide a ΣP3 procedure for verifying that a GPL
∆
R formula Ψ is satisﬁable.
Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 14, we can guess an implicant of Ψ of the
following form:
Θ=Nv1(α1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(αn) ∧∆
X1
w1
(β1) ∧ ... ∧∆
Xm
wm (βm)
where X1, ..., Xm are sets of atomic formulas. We give a Σ
P
2 procedure for checking
that Θ is not saﬁsﬁable. First verify whether α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn is satisﬁable, using an NP
oracle. If this is the case, select a βi, guess a model ω of βi, and verify using the
NP-oracle that conjXω ∧ {αj | vj ≥ ν(wi)} is inconsistent. It follows that checking the
satisﬁability of Θ is in ΠP2 , and can thus be done in constant time using a Σ
P
2 -oracle.
Proposition 17. The problem of deciding whether Φ |=c Ψ, for Φ and Ψ two GPL
∆
R formu-
las, is ΠP4 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
Proof. Hardness Let X ∪Y ∪Z ∪U be a partition of the set of atomic formulas. We show
that checking the validity of the QBF ψ=∀X∃Y ∀Z∃U . φ(X, Y, Z, U) is equivalent to
checking whether Φ |=c Ψ where:
Φ=
( ∧
x∈X
N1(x) ∨N1(¬x)
)
∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z, U))
∧
((( ∧
y∈Y
N1(y ∨ a) ∨N1(¬y ∨ a)
)
∧∆
Z∪{a}
1 (¬a)
)
∨N1(a)
)
Ψ=¬N1(a)
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Indeed, ﬁrst note that for every subset X0 ⊂ X (i.e., for every interpretation of X),
Φ has a minimally speciﬁc e-model in which
∧
x∈X0
N1(x) ∧
∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x) is true.
To see why this is the case, note that the least speciﬁc e-model π1 of
∧
x∈X0
N1(x) ∧∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x)∧N1(a) is an e-model of Φ and for any e-model π2 of Φ which is strictly
less speciﬁc than π1, it must be the case that π2 |=
∧
x∈X0
N1(x)∧
∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x). We
thus ﬁnd that Φ |=c Ψ iﬀ for every X0 ⊂ X, it holds that f(X0) |=c Ψ, where:
f(X0)=
∧
x∈X0
N1(x) ∧
∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x) ∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z, U))
∧
((( ∧
y∈Y
N1(y ∨ a) ∨N1(¬y ∨ a)
)
∧∆
Z∪{a}
1 (¬a)
)
∨N1(a)
)
Note that |=GPLΦ ≡
∨
X0⊆X
f(X0). Now let us deﬁne g(X0) and f(X0, Y0) for X0 ⊆ X
and Y0 ⊆ Y as follows:
g(X0)=
∧
x∈X0
N1(x) ∧
∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x) ∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z, U)) ∧N1(a)
f(X0, Y0)=
∧
x∈X0
N1(x) ∧
∧
x/∈X0
N1(¬x) ∧N1(φ(X, Y, Z, U))
∧
∧
y∈Y0
N1(y ∨ a) ∧
∧
y/∈Y0
N1(¬y ∨ a) ∧∆
Z∪{a}
1 (¬a)
Note that f(X0) = g(X0) ∨
∨
Y0⊆Y
f(X0, Y0). If there exists a Y0 ⊆ Y such that
f(X0, Y0) is consistent, then clearly the least speciﬁc e-model of f(X0, Y0) will be
strictly less speciﬁc than any e-model of g(X0). Furthermore note that f(X0, Y0) |=c
¬N1(a) while g(X0) |=c N1(a). In other words, we have f(X0) |=c ¬N1(a) iﬀ there
exists a Y0 ⊆ Y such that f(X0, Y0) is consistent. The latter condition will be satisﬁed
iﬀ for every Z0 ⊆ Z it holds that
∧
x∈X0
x∧
∧
x/∈X0
¬x∧
∧
y∈Y0
y∧
∧
y/∈Y0
¬y∧
∧
z∈Z0
z ∧∧
z /∈Z0
¬z∧φ(X, Y, Z, U) is consistent. In other words, iﬀ for every Z0 ⊆ Z there exists
a U0 ⊆ U such that X0 ∪ Y0 ∪ Z0 ∪ U0 deﬁnes a model of φ(X, Y, Z, U).
In summary we have that Φ |=c Ψ iﬀ for every X0 it holds that f(X0) |=c Ψ, iﬀ for
every X0 there exists a Y0 such that f(X0, Y0) is consistent, iﬀ for every X0 there exists
a Y0 such that for every Z0 there exists a Y0 such that X0 ∪ Y0 ∪ Z0 ∪ U0 deﬁnes a
model of φ(X, Y, Z, U), iﬀ the QBF ψ is valid.
Membership We give a ΣP4 procedure for checking Φ 6|=c Ψ, from which the membership
result immediately follows. As in the proof of Proposition 16, we can guess an implicant
of Φ of the following form:
Φ0=Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(γn) ∧∆
X1
w1
(δ1) ∧ ... ∧∆
Xm
wm (δm)
where X1, ..., Xm are sets of atomic formulas. Using a Σ
P
2 oracle, we can verify that Φ0
is consistent, as in the proof of Proposition 16. Since the unique least speciﬁc e-model
of Φ0 is also the least speciﬁc e-model of Nv1(γ1)∧ ...∧Nvn(γn), using a Σ
P
2 oracle, we
can check in polynomial time that Φ0 6|=c Ψ. Indeed:
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• The satisfaction of meta-literals of the form Nλ(ǫ), Πλ(ǫ), ∆λ(ǫ) and ∇λ(ǫ) oc-
curring in Ψ can be veriﬁed as in the proof of Proposition 15.
• To check whetherNv1(γ1)∧...∧Nvn(γn) |=c ∆
X
λ (ǫ), it suﬃces to check the validity
of the following QBF:
∀X . (∃(At \X) . ǫ)→ (∃(At \X) .
∧
{γi | vi ≥ ν(λ)})
This can be accomplished in constant time using a ΣP2 oracle.
• To check whether Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ Nvn(γn) |=c ∇
X
λ (ǫ), it suﬃces to check that
Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ Nvn(γn) 6|=c ∆
X
λ (¬ǫ), since Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ Nvn(γn) has a unique
least speciﬁc e-model.
Finally, we give a ΣP3 procedure for showing that the least speciﬁc e-model of Φ0 is
not a minimally speciﬁc e-model of Φ. In particular, we guess an implicant of Φ of the
form:
Φ1=Nu1(ǫ1) ∧ ... ∧Nus(ǫs) ∧∆
Y1
z1
(ζ1) ∧ ... ∧∆
Yt
zt (ζt)
We can then verify using a ΣP2 oracle that Φ1 is consistent. Using an NP oracle, we
can furthermore verify that Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ Nvn(γn) |= Nu1(ǫ1) ∧ ... ∧ Nus(ǫs) while
Nu1(ǫ1) ∧ ... ∧Nus(ǫs) 6|= Nv1(γ1) ∧ ... ∧Nvn(γn), from which it follows that the least
speciﬁc e-model of Φ1 is strictly less speciﬁc than the least speciﬁc e-model of Φ0.
Corollary 4. The problem of deciding whether Φ |=b Ψ, for Φ and Ψ two GPL
∆
R formulas,
is ΣP4 -complete (in the joint size of Φ and Ψ).
7.4. Complexity of reasoning in GPL≻ and GPL
core
≻
To characterize the complexity of satisﬁability checking in GPLcore≻ , we can take ad-
vantage of a straightforward reduction to GPLk. First note that when only ﬁnitely many
certainty degrees are considered, ≻ can be introduced as an abbreviation in GPLk:
α ≻ β =
k∨
i=1
(
N i
k
(α) ∧ ¬N i
k
(β)
)
(52)
For ﬁnite knowledge bases, we never really need inﬁnitely many certainty degrees, although
the required number can depend on the size of the considered formulas. This is made precise
in the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Let Φ = {α1 ≻ β1, ..., αn ≻ βn, γn+1 ∼ δn+1, ..., γm ∼ δm}. If k ≥ n, it
holds that Φ is satisfiable in GPLk iff Φ is satisfiable in GPL
core
≻ .
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Proof. Since any e-model of Φ in GPLk is also an e-model of Φ in GPL
core
≻ , it is clear that
satisﬁability in GPLk entails satisﬁability in GPL
core
≻ .
Conversely, let π be an e-model of Ψ in GPLcore≻ . In particular, among all such e-models,
let π be such that the number of certainty levels in Λ = {π(ω) |ω ∈ Ω} is minimal. Let
Λ′ = {1−N(αi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {1−N(βi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}⊆ Λ. It holds that Λ = Λ
′. Indeed, if
this were not the case, we could deﬁne a possibility distribution π′ as follows:
π′(ω) =


max{λ |λ < π(ω), λ ∈ Λ′} if π(ω) /∈ Λ′ and π(ω) > minΛ′
minΛ if π(ω) < minΛ′
π(ω) otherwise
(53)
It is straightforward to verify that the necessity measure induced by π′ still satisﬁes all
constraints. This shows that it is possible to choose a possibility distribution π′ which only
takes values from Λ′. Since we moreover clearly have that Λ′ ⊆ Λ, and π was assumed to
minimize |Λ|, we ﬁnd Λ′ = Λ.
We now show that |Λ| ≤ n+ 1. In particular, we show that if λ ∈ Λ \ {minΛ,maxΛ} it
holds that there are at least two diﬀerent formulas χ1, χ2 among {α1, ..., αn, β1, ..., βn} such
that N(χ1) = N(χ2) = 1− λ. Suppose this were not the case, and that e.g., αi is the only
formula for which N(αi) = 1− λ. Deﬁne π
′ as follows:
π′(ω) =
{
max{µ : µ ∈ Λ′, µ < λ} if π(ω) = 1− λ
π(ω) otherwise
Then it is clear that the necessity measure induced by π′ still satisﬁes all constraints, while
π′ uses strictly fewer certainty levels than π, a contradiction. The case where βi is the
only formula with necessity 1 − λ is entirely analogous. Finally, since only the relative
ordering of the certainty levels matters, it is always possible to choose π such that Λ =
{0, 1
k
, ..., 1}, k ≥ n. In other words, there exists an e-model π ∈ Pk of Φ.
In general, to verify whether Φ |=≻ Ψ holds, we can rewrite Φ∧¬Ψ such that it is free of
negations, by using the fact that ¬(α ≻ β) is equivalent to (α ∼ β)∨ (β ≻ α), and similarly
¬(α ∼ β) is equivalent to (α ≻ β) ∨ (β ≻ α). Let Θ be the resulting formula. Then a
suitable lower bound for k, ensuring that Φ |=≻ Ψ iﬀ Φ |=
k
GPL Ψ, can be found as follows:
bound(α ≻ β) = 1
bound(α ∼ β) = 0
bound(Θ1 ∧Θ1) = bound(Θ1) + bound(Θ2)
bound(Θ1 ∨Θ1) = max(bound(Θ1), bound(Θ2))
Since satisﬁability checking in GPLcore≻ can thus be reduced to checking the satisﬁability of
a GPL formula (whose size is polynomial in the size of the initial formula), it follows that
this problem is in NP.
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Proposition 19. The complexity of deciding whether a GPLcore≻ formula is satisfiable is
NP-complete (w.r.t. the size of the formula).
Proof. To see why satisﬁability checking in GPLcore≻ is NP-hard, note that the propositional
formula α is satisﬁable iﬀ α ≻ ⊥ is satisﬁable. NP-membership directly follows from Propo-
sition 18.
Proposition 20. The complexity of deciding whether a GPL≻ formula is satisfiable is NP-
complete (w.r.t. the size of the formula).
Proof. NP-hardness trivially follows from Proposition 19. We now propose an NP procedure
to check the satisﬁability of a GPL≻ formula Φ. First, if Φ is satisﬁable, in polynomial time
we can guess a satisﬁable term of the following form:
n∧
i=1
Nλi(αi) ∧
m∧
i=n+1
¬Nλi(αi) ∧
p∧
i=m+1
(αi ≻ βi) ∧
q∧
i=p+1
(αi ∼ βi)
From Lemma 3 in Appendix C, we know that this term is satisﬁable iﬀ the following GPLcore≻
formula is satisﬁable.∧
{αi ≻ αj | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m,λi ≥ λj} ∧
∧
{αi ∼ ⊤ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, λi = 1}
∧
∧
{⊤ ≻ αi |n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∧
∧
{αi ≻ ⊥ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∧
∧
{αi ≻ βi |m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ p} ∧
∧
{αi ∼ βi | p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ q}
As in the proof of Proposition 19, we ﬁnd that the satisﬁability of this latter formula can
be checked using an NP procedure.
8. Concluding remarks
We have introduced generalized possibilistic logic (GPL) as a general framework for rea-
soning about the revealed beliefs of an external agent. At the syntactic level, formulas in
GPL are propositional combinations of meta-literals of the form Nλ(α), expressing that it
is known that an external agent believes α with certainty (at least) λ. Meta-literals of the
form Πλ(α), ∆λ(α) and ∇λ(α) have also been introduced as abbreviations in the language.
At the semantic level, the four considered types of meta-literals correspond to lower bounds
on the four main uncertainty measures from possibility theory, i.e., the necessity, possibility,
guaranteed possibility and potential necessity measures. We have moreover introduced a re-
ﬁnement of∆λ(α) and ∇λ(α) to express context-dependent information about the ignorance
of the agent in a more compact way.
After presenting an axiomatization of GPL and proving its soundness and completeness,
we have studied two diﬀerent ways to reason about the ignorance of an external agent,
based on the principle of minimal speciﬁcity and based on guaranteed possibility respec-
tively. Subsequently, we discussed the ability of GPL to model comparative uncertainty.
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Among others, we axiomatized a logic, which can be embedded in GPL, to reason about
arbitrary propositional combinations of statements of the form “α is (strictly) more certain
than β”. As a special case, we obtain that GPL can be used to reason about propositional
combinations of defaults, in the sense of System P. Next, we showed that the ability of
GPL to model ignorance makes it a natural vehicle for expressing the semantics of non-
monotonic logic programming formalisms. In particular, we showed how disjunctive answer
set programs naturally correspond to a type of GPL theories, with answer sets correspond-
ing to minimally speciﬁc e-models which are Boolean, in the sense that all interpretations
are either possible to degree 1 or to degree 0. We then compared GPL with a fragment of
Lifschitz’ logic of minimal belief and negation as failure (MBNF) which generalizes disjunc-
tive answer set programming. While there is a close relationship between theories in this
fragment of MBNF and the corresponding GPL theories, we have found that the notion of
minimality demanded of MBNF models is less strict than the notion of minimal speciﬁcity,
which is similar to an observation we made in [8] about equilibrium logic. While the less
demanding notion of minimality in MBNF and equilibrium logic may have technical advan-
tages, in particular for modelling inclusive disjunction [75], this ﬁnding casts doubt on the
appropriateness of logics such as MBNF and equilibrium logic for epistemic reasoning.
In terms of computational complexity, we found natural decision problems at the ﬁrst,
second, third and fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy, where the third and fourth level
are only reached when the reﬁned modalities ∆λ(α) and ∇λ(α) are allowed. This conﬁrms
that the latter modalities allow us to compactly express knowledge that would otherwise
require exponentially long formulas (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
The ability of GPL to model both negation-as-failure and conditionals in an intuitive
way demonstrates its versatility as a general logic for reasoning about the beliefs of an agent
from an outsider point of view (as opposed to introspective reasoning). Among others, this
makes GPL a natural choice for the formal study of access control mechanisms that need
to maintain the conﬁdentiality of some pieces of knowledge. For example, [78] discusses
a number of settings where an information system needs to be able to determine whether
answering a given query would allow the user to derive information that is supposed to
remain secret, based on possibly incomplete knowledge of what that user already knows.
The use of GPL is also natural in game theoretic settings, where agents need to reason
based on their incomplete knowledge about the goals of other agents, e.g., as part of a
negotiation process [79].
There are several ways in which GPL can be further extended. For example, a frame-
work for multi-agent epistemic reasoning could be obtained by encapsulating GPL formulas
similarly to how GPL encapsulates propositional formulas. Let us write N(λ,A)(α) to de-
note that agent A knows α with certainty λ. A formula such as N(λ,A)(N(µ,B)(β)) expresses
that (I know) that A knows with certainty λ that B knows β with certainty µ. At the
semantic level, in the two-agent case, e-models would be of the form (πA, πB, πAB, πBA),
where πA and πB are possibility distributions over propositional interpretations (encod-
ing what objective formulas A and B know), and πAB and πBA are possibility distribu-
tions over possibility distributions over propositional interpretations (encoding resp. what
A knows about what B knows, and what B knows about what A knows). We then have e.g.
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(πA, πB, πAB, πBA) |= N(λ,A)(α ∧N(µ,B)(β)), expressing that (I know that) A knows α and
A knows that B knows β, iﬀ πA |= Nλ(α) and NAB{τ | τ |= Nµ(β)} ≥ λ, where NAB is the
necessity measure induced by πAB. Note that this approach does not allow us to consider
chains of arbitrary length, e.g., formulas such as N(λ1,A)(N(µ,B)(N(λ2,A)(α))) would require
e-models of the form (πA, πB, πAB, πBA, πABA, πBAB). In practice, this would not be a restric-
tion, as we only need to consider those chains that appear in the given GPL knowledge base.
Among others, it would be interesting to see how the interplay between minimal speciﬁcity
and guaranteed possibility would allow us to model limits on agents’ knowledge, and how
such models would compare against multi-agent extensions of only knowing [80, 81].
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The soundness of the axioms (PL), (K), (N), (D) and (W) w.r.t. the semantics of
GPL can readily be veriﬁed. Here we show that these axioms are also complete.
Let F = {Nλ(α) |α ∈ L, λ ∈ Λ
+
k }. Let Ω
∗ be the set of all propositional interpreta-
tions over the set of atomic formulas F . Given a GPL knowledge base K, let K∗ be the
propositional knowledge base over F , deﬁned as
K∗ =K ∪ {Nλ(α→ β)→ (Nλ(α)→ Nλ(β)) |α, β ∈ L and λ ∈ Λ
+
k }
∪ {N1(⊤)} ∪ {Nλ(α)→ ¬N 1
k
(¬α) |α ∈ L}
∪ {Nλ1(α)→ Nλ2(α) |α ∈ L, λ1 ≥ λ2}
where α→ β is an arbitrary (but ﬁxed) formula from L which is equivalent to α→ β, and
similarly for ¬α. We then have that Φ can be derived from K using the axioms (PL), (K),
(N), (D), (W) and modus ponens iﬀ Φ can be derived from K∗ in propositional logic.
To ﬁnish the proof, note that with every model I of K∗, we can associate a set-function
gI : 2
Ω → Λ deﬁned for α ∈ L as
gI(JαK) = max{λ | I |= Nλ(α)}
where we deﬁne gI(JαK) = 0 if {λ | I |= Nλ(α)} = ∅. From the fact that K
∗ contains every
instantiation of the axioms (K), (N), (D) and (W), we can derive the following properties
for the function gI :
• We have gI(Ω) = 1 thanks to the fact that N1(⊤) ∈ K
∗.
• We have gI(∅) = 0. Indeed, since K
∗ contains N1(⊤) and N1(⊤) → ¬N 1
k
(⊥) (as an
instantiation of (D)) and Nλ(⊥) → N 1
k
(⊥) for every λ ∈ Λ+k (as an instantiation of
(W)) we know that I |= ¬Nλ(⊥) for every λ ∈ Λ
+
k . It follows that {λ | I |= Nλ(⊥)} =
∅ and thus gI(∅) = gI(J⊥K) = 0.
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• We have that gI is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Indeed, if JαK ⊆ JβK then α |= β holds,
which means that K∗ will entail Nλ(α)→ Nλ(β) for every λ ∈ Λ
+
k (as an instantiation
of (K)). It follows that {λ | I |= Nλ(α)} ⊆ {λ | I |= Nλ(β)} and gI(JαK) ≤ gI(JβK).
• We have that gI(Jα ∧ βK) = min(gI(JαK), gI(JβK)) for every α, β ∈ L. Indeed from the
monotonicity of gI we already have gI(Jα ∧ βK) ≤ min(gI(JαK), gI(JβK)). Conversely,
assume I |= Nλ(α) and I |= Nλ(β). Using Nλ(β) and the instantiation of (K) on
the tautology β → (α → (α ∧ β)) we ﬁnd I |= Nλ(α → (α ∧ β)). Using another
instantiation of (K) we ﬁnd from I |= Nλ(α → (α ∧ β)) and I |= Nλ(α) that I |=
Nλ(α ∧ β). It follows that {λ | I |= Nλ(α)} ∩ {λ | I |= Nλ(β)} ⊆ {λ | I |= Nλ(α ∧ β)}
and gI(Jα ∧ βK) ≥ min(gI(JαK), gI(JβK).
It is well-known [12] that every set-function which satisﬁes these four criteria is a necessity
measure, and this necessity measure uniquely identiﬁes a normalized possibility distribution
π, which by construction will be an e-model of K. Conversely, it is easy to see that every
e-model π of K corresponds to a unique propositional model I of K∗, deﬁned as I |= Nλ(α)
iﬀ N(α) ≥ λ for N the necessity measure induced by π.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4
Before we present the proof of the main result, which will apply to arbitrary propositional
combinations of comparative certainty statements, we show that the proposed axioms are
suﬃcient for detecting inconsistencies in sets of statements of the form α ≻ β.
Lemma 1. Let Θ = {α1 ≻ β1, ..., αn ≻ βn}. It holds that Θ has an e-model iff Θ 6⊢
core
≻ ⊥.
Proof. The soundness of the axioms follows easily from well-known properties of necessity
measures. We thus focus on showing that ⊥ can be derived if Θ is not satisﬁable.
For each αi there exist formulas α
1
i , ..., α
mi
i such that αi=α
1
i ∧ ... ∧ α
mi
i and such that
for each formula αji it holds that Jα
j
i K = Ω \ {ω
j
i } for some propositional interpretation ω
j
i .
Similarly, for each βi there are formulas β
1
i , ..., β
ni
i such that βi=β
1
i ∧ ... ∧ β
ni
i and for each
k it holds that Jβki K = Ω \ {ω
k
i } for some propositional interpretation ω
k
i .
From αi ≻ βi we can derive using (Ax3) that α
j
i ≻ βi for every j ∈ {1, ...,mi}. Further-
more, using (25) we can derive Aji=(α
j
i ≻ β
1
i )∨ ...∨ (α
j
i ≻ β
ni
i ). Conversely, from A
j
i we can
derive αji ≻ βi using (Ax3), and from {α
1
i ≻ βi, ..., α
mi
i ≻ βi} we can derive αi ≻ βi using
(Ax2) and (Ax3). It follows that αi ≻ βi is equivalent to {A
1
i , ..., A
mi
i }.
Let φ be a mapping from {1, ..., n} × {1, ...,mi} to {1, ..., ni}, allowing us to choose for
each formula Aji a disjunct α
j
i ≻ β
φ(i,j)
i . Clearly Θ is satisﬁable iﬀ there exists a mapping φ
such that Θφ = {α
j
i ≻ β
φ(i,j)
i | i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {1, ...,mi}} is satisﬁable. Accordingly, for Θ
to be unsatisﬁable, it suﬃces to show that for each such mapping φ, ⊥ can be derived from
the formulas in Θφ.
Each formula αji ≻ β
φ(i,j)
i corresponds to a constraint of the form N(α
j
i ) > N(β
φ(i,j)
i ),
which by construction corresponds to the constraint π(ωji ) < π(ω
φ(i,j)
i ) on the associated
possibility distribution. Clearly a set of such constraints can be satisﬁed unless there is
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a cycle of the form π(ω1) < π(ω2), π(ω2) < π(ω3), ..., π(ωr) < π(ω1). In such a case, Θφ
contains formulas of the form χ1 ≻ χ2, χ2 ≻ χ3, ..., χr ≻ χ1 (up to syntactic variations of
the arguments χl which we can ignore because of (Ax3)). By repeatedly applying (20) we
can then derive χ1 ≻ χ1, which allows us to derive ⊥ using (Ax4). Thus we have shown
that Θφ is unsatisﬁable iﬀ ⊥ can be derived.
In the next lemma, we additionally consider formulas of the form γ ∼ δ.
Lemma 2. Let Θ = {α1 ≻ β1, ..., αn ≻ βn, γn+1 ∼ δn+1, ..., γm ∼ δm}. It holds that Θ has
an e-model iff Θ 6⊢core≻ ⊥.
Proof. We show that Θ has an e-model if Θ 6⊢core≻ ⊥; the other direction follows from the
soundness of the axioms.
From Lemma 1 we know that {α1 ≻ β1, ..., αn ≻ βn} is satisﬁable, given that we assumed
that no inconsistency can be derived. Let π be a possibility distribution that satisﬁes
{α1 ≻ β1, ..., αn ≻ βn}. From the fact that ≻ is a strict partial order, the fact that ∼
is an equivalence relation and (Ax5), it follows that we can partition the set of formulas
X = {α1, ..., αn, β1, ..., βn, γn+1, ..., γm, δn+1, ..., δm} as X = X1∪...∪Xs where for χ ∈ Xr and
χ′ ∈ Xt, with r < t, it holds that Θ contains a conjunct α ≻ β where |=α ≡ χ and |=β ≡ χ
′.
Let Lr = {1−N(χ) |χ ∈ Xr}. Because of how we choose π, it holds that maxLr < minLt
for r < t. We now deﬁne the possibility distribution π′ as follows:
π′(ω) =


minL1 if π(ω) ≤ maxL1
minLs if π(ω) > maxLs−1
minLr if 1 < r < s and maxLr−1 < π(ω) ≤ maxLr
Let N ′ be the necessity measure induced by π′. It is straightforward to verify that N ′(χ) =
N ′(χ′) for χ, χ′ ∈ Xr and that N
′(χ) > N ′(χ′) if χ ∈ Xr and χ
′ ∈ Xt with r < t. In other
words, it holds that π′ |=≻ Θ.
Proposition 4 now follows easily.
Proof. The soundness of the axioms can be veriﬁed straightforwardly. To see why the com-
pleteness result holds, note that when Φ |=≻ Ψ holds, we have that Φ ∧ ¬Ψ is unsatisﬁable.
Let Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn be a formula in DNF which is equivalent to Φ ∧ ¬Ψ, where each disjunct
Φi is a conjunction φ
i
1 ∧ ...∧φ
i
n of meta-literals of the form α ≻ β and α ∼ β. From Lemma
2 it immediately follows that each such a disjunct Φi is unsatisﬁable iﬀ φ1 ∧ ...∧ φn ⊢
core
≻ ⊥.
Since Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn is inconsistent, none of the disjuncts Φi are satisﬁable, from which we
can thus conclude Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn ⊢
core
≻ ⊥ and thus Φ ⊢
core
≻ Ψ.
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 3. Let K = {Nλi(αi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}∪{¬Nλi(αi) |n+1 ≤ i ≤ m}∪{αi ≻ βi |m+1 ≤
i ≤ p} ∪ {αi ∼ βi | p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ q}. Let the set of GPL
core
≻ formulas L be given by:
L = {αi ≻ αj | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m,λi ≥ λj} ∪ {αi ∼ ⊤ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, λi = 1}
∪ {⊤ ≻ αi |n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {αi ≻ ⊥ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
∪ {αi ≻ βi |m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ p} ∪ {αi ∼ βi | p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ q}
It holds that K has an e-model iff L has an e-model.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that all the considered axioms are sound, hence when
K has an e-model it must be the case that L has an e-model as well. Conversely, suppose
that L has an e-model π. Note that by deﬁnition of e-model, π is then normalised. Clearly
all formulas of the form α ≻ β and α ∼ β in K are satisﬁed by π, as these formulas are
also included in L. Furthermore, for every formula of the form N1(α) in K, L will contain
the formula α ∼ ⊤, and thus N(α) = N(⊤) = 1 for N the necessity measure induced by π.
Hence all formulas of the form N1(α) from K are satisﬁed by π.
• Assume that some formulaNλl(αl), with λl < 1, is not satisﬁed by π and let c = N(αl);
note that we then have c < λl. Furthermore note that c > 0 since L contains the
formula α ≻ ⊥. Let d be the smallest element from the set {λn+1, ..., λm, 1} which is
strictly greater than λl; since λl < 1 such an element d must indeed exist. We deﬁne
the normalized possibility distribution π′ for ω ∈ Ω as follows:
π′(ω) =
{
π(ω) if π(ω) > 1− c or π(ω) ≤ 1− d
1− λl −
(1−c−π(ω))
d−c
(d− λl) otherwise
The transformation from π to π′ is illustrated in Figure 1(a). First note that from
c > 0 and the fact that π is normalised, it follows that π′ is normalised. Furthermore,
since c < λl < d we have that the transformation from π to π
′ is order-preserving, i.e.
we have π(ω1) < π(ω2) iﬀ π
′(ω1) < π
′(ω2). It follows that π
′ satisﬁes all formulas of the
form α ≻ β and α ∼ β in K, given that π satisﬁes these formulas, as the satisfaction
of such formulas only relies on the ordering of the possibility degrees. It clearly also
holds that π′ |= Nλl(αl). Indeed, since N(αl) = c we know that π(ω) ≤ 1− c for every
model of ¬αl. By deﬁnition of π
′ this means that π(ω) ≤ 1− λl for each such ω, and
thus π′ |= Nλl(αl). Furthermore, since π
′(ω) ≤ π(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω, it holds that π′
satisﬁes all the formulas of the form Nλ(α) that were already satisﬁed by π.
We now show that the same holds for formulas of the form ¬Nλ(α). Suppose π |=≻
¬Nλp(αp), with p ∈ {n+ 1, ...,m}.
– If λp > λl then λp ≥ d. If it were the case that π
′ |=≻ Nλp(αp), then for every
model ω of ¬αp we would have π
′(ω) ≤ 1−λp ≤ 1−d. However, by construction of
π′ this would mean π′(ω) = π(ω) for each model of ¬αp and thus N(αp) = N
′(αp),
a contradiction.
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– If λp ≤ λl then αl ≻ αp is in L. Hence we have that c = N(αl) > N(αp). It
follows that there is some model ω∗ of ¬αp such that π(ω
∗) > 1−min(c, λp). By
deﬁnition of π′ we then have π′(ω∗) = π(ω) and thus π′ |=≻ ¬Nmin(c,λp)(αp) and
a fortiori π′ |=≻ ¬Nλp(αp).
• Now consider the case where some formula ¬Nλl(αl) is not satisﬁed by π, and let us
write c = N(αl); note that we then have c ≥ λl > 0. Furthermore note that we have
c < 1 since L contains the formula ⊤ ≻ α. Let d be the largest element from the set
{λ1, ..., λn, 0} which is strictly smaller than λl; since λl > 0, such an element d must
exist. Let us write e = d+λl
2
. We deﬁne the normalized possibility distribution π′ for
ω ∈ Ω as follows:
π′(ω) =
{
π(ω) if π(ω) < 1− c or π(ω) ≥ 1− d
1− e+ (1−c−π(ω))
d−c
(e− d) otherwise
This transformation from π to π′ is illustrated in Figure 1(b). Since π′(ω) ≥ π(ω) and π
is normalised, we have that π′ is normalised as well. Furthermore, since d < e < λl ≤ c,
we have that the transformation from π to π′ is order-preserving, and thus that π′
satisﬁes all formulas of the form α ≻ β and α ∼ β. We also have that π′ |= ¬Nλl(αl).
Indeed, since c < 1 there must exist model ω∗ of ¬αl such that π(ω
∗) = 1 − c. By
construction, it holds that π′(ω∗) = 1− e, from which it follows that N ′(αl) ≤ e < λl,
with N ′ the necessity measure induced by π′. Furthermore, since π′(ω) ≥ π(ω) for
every ω ∈ Ω, it holds that π′ satisﬁes all the formulas ¬Nλp(αp) that were already
satisﬁed by π.
We now show that the same holds for formulas of the form Nλp(αp). Suppose π |=≻
Nλp(αp), with p ∈ {1, ..., n}.
– If λl > λp then λp ≤ d. Suppose π
′ 6|=≻ Nλp(αp). Then there exists a model
ω∗ of ¬αp such that π
′(ω∗) > 1 − λp. However, since 1 − λp ≥ 1 − d, we have
π′(ω∗) = π(ω∗), which would mean π 6|=≻ Nλp(αp), a contradiction.
– If λl ≤ λp then αp ≻ αl is in L, and thus N(αp) > N(αl) = c. It follows that
π(ω) < 1− c for every model of ¬αp. Thus we have π(ω) = π
′(ω) for every model
of ¬αp, and in particular N(αp) = N
′(αp), for N
′ the necessity measure induced
by π′.
By iterating this construction until all formulas of the form Nλl(αl) and ¬Nλl(αl) are sat-
isﬁed, we obtain an e-model of K.
Noting that all formulas in the set L can be derived from K using ⊢≻, the completeness
of the GPL≻ axioms follows easily from the previous lemma, together with the completeness
of the GPLcore≻ axioms from Section 5.2.
Proof. As it is clear that Φ ⊢≻ Ψ implies Φ |=≻ Ψ, we focus on the completeness result.
If Φ |=≻ Ψ then Φ ∧ ¬Ψ is unsatisﬁable. Let Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn be a formula in DNF which is
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(a) (b)
Figure C.1: Transformations used in the proof of Lemma 3.
equivalent to Φ ∧ ¬Ψ, where each disjunct Φi is a conjunction φ
i
1 ∧ ... ∧ φ
i
n of meta-literals
of the form Nλ(α), ¬Nλ(α), α ≻ β and α ∼ β. From Lemma 3 it immediately follows that
each such a disjunct Φi is unsatisﬁable iﬀ φ1∧ ...∧φn ⊢≻ ⊥. Since Φ1∨ ...∨Φn is inconsistent,
none of the disjuncts Φi are satisﬁable, from which we can thus conclude Φ1 ∨ ...∨Φn ⊢≻ ⊥
and thus Φ ⊢≻ Ψ.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 7
We ﬁrst show the soundness of the axioms.
Proof. As already discussed, the soundness of the axioms (RE), (LLE), (RW), (OR),
(CM), (CUT) and (INC) follows from the soudness of (Ax1) and (RI1)–(RI3). To show
that (WRM) is sound w.r.t. the possibilistic semantics it is suﬃcient to show that for any
possibility measure Π it holds that Π(α ∧ γ) > Π(α ∧ ¬γ) and Π(α ∧ ¬β) ≤ Π(α ∧ β)
together imply Π(α ∧ β ∧ γ) > Π(α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ). To see that this is the case6, note that
Π(α∧γ) > Π(α∧¬γ) means that either Π(α∧β∧γ) > Π(α∧¬γ) or Π(α∧¬β∧γ) > Π(α∧¬γ).
In the former case, we readily obtain Π(α∧β∧γ) > Π(α∧β∧¬γ). In the latter case, we also
need to have Π(α∧β ∧ γ) > Π(α∧β ∧¬γ) since otherwise we ﬁnd Π(α∧¬β) ≤ Π(α∧β) =
Π(α∧ β ∧¬γ), and in particular Π(α∧¬β ∧ γ) ≤ Π(α∧¬β) ≤ Π(α∧ β ∧¬γ) ≤ Π(α∧¬γ),
a contradiction.
To show the completeness result, we will use two lemmas.
Lemma 4. c(α1|∼β1) ∧ ... ∧ c(αn|∼βn) is satisfiable iff c(α1|∼β1) ∧ ... ∧ c(αn|∼βn) 6⊢c ⊥.
6The proof appears in [83] but is given again as this paper may be hard to ﬁnd.
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Proof. We show that c(α1|∼β1)∧ ...∧ c(αn|∼βn) ⊢c ⊥ if c(α1|∼β1)∧ ...∧ c(αn|∼βn) is unsat-
isﬁable. The other direction trivially follows from the soundness of the axioms.
Without loss of generality we can assume that Ψ=c(α1|∼β1) ∧ ... ∧ c(αn−1|∼βn−1) is
satisﬁable, but that every e-model π of Ψ is such that Π(αn∧βn) ≤ Π(αn∧¬βn), with Π the
possibility measure induced by π (i.e., from an inconsistent conjunction of conditionals with
a consistent antecedent, we can always select a non-empty, maximal consistent subset of
conditionals). This is only possible if every e-model π of Ψ is such that Π(αn∧βn) < Π(αn∧
¬βn). Indeed, suppose there was an e-model π of Ψ such that Π(αn∧βn) = Π(αn∧¬βn) < 1
and deﬁne π′ as follows (0 < ε < 1− Π(αn ∧ βn)):
π′(ω) =
{
π(ω) + ε if π(ω) = Π(αn ∧ βn) and ω |= αn ∧ βn
π(ω) otherwise
It is easy to see that if ε < minn−1i=1 (Π(αi∧βi)−Π(αi∧¬βi)) it holds that π
′ is an e-model of
c(α1|∼β1)∧ ...∧ c(αn|∼βn). If Π(αn ∧ βn) = Π(αn ∧¬βn) = 1 we instead deﬁne π
′ as follows
(0 < ε < Π(αn ∧ ¬βn)):
π′(ω) =
{
π(ω)− ε if π(ω) = Π(αn ∧ ¬βn) and ω |= αn ∧ ¬βn
π(ω) otherwise
Thus we can assume that for every e-model π of Ψ, we have π|=cc(αn|∼¬βn). Given the
completeness result from [59] for consistent sets of conditionals, it follows that c(αn|∼¬βn)
can be derived from c(α1|∼β1) ∧ ... ∧ c(αn−1|∼βn−1). Finally, using (INC) and the axioms
of classical logic, we can derive ⊥ from c(αn|∼¬βn) and c(αn|∼βn).
Lemma 5. Let {γ1|∼δ1, ..., γm|∼δm} be a rationally closed set of defaults and let Φ =
c(γ1|∼δ1) ∧ ... ∧ c(γm|∼δm) ∧ ¬c(γm+1|∼δm+1) ∧ ... ∧ ¬c(γr|∼δr). It holds that Φ is satis-
fiable iff Φ 6⊢ ⊥.
Proof. Assume that Φ 6⊢ ⊥; we show that Φ has an e-model. Note that the other direction
follows trivially from the soundness of the axioms.
Since Φ 6⊢ ⊥, it follows from Lemma 4 that the set of conditionals {γ1|∼δ1, ..., γm|∼δm} is
consistent. Given the correspondence between consistent sets of conditionals and possibility
theory shown in [59], this means that c(γ1|∼δ1)∧...∧c(γm|∼δm) is satisﬁable, and in particular
that it has an e-model π such that the conditionals satisﬁed by π are exactly those in
{γ1|∼δ1, ..., γm|∼δm}, since we assumed that this set is rationally closed. Since Φ 6⊢ ⊥ it
holds that none of the defaults γm+1|∼δm+1, ..., γr|∼δr is included in this latter set, and thus
that π is an e-model of Φ.
We now show the completeness result.
Proof. As it is clear that Φ ⊢c Ψ implies Φ |=c Ψ, we focus on the completeness result.
If Φ |=c Ψ then Φ ∧ ¬Ψ is unsatisﬁable. Let Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn be a formula in DNF which is
equivalent to Φ ∧ ¬Ψ, where each disjunct Φi is a conjunction φ
i
1 ∧ ... ∧ φ
i
n of meta-literals
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of the form c(γ|∼δ) or ¬c(γ|∼δ). Moreover, thanks to axiom (WRM) we can assume that
the set of meta-literals of the form c(γ|∼δ) correspond to a rationally closed set of defaults.
From Lemma 5 it then follows that each such a disjunct Φi is satisﬁable iﬀ φ1∧ ...∧φn ⊢c ⊥.
Since Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn is inconsistent, none of the disjuncts Φi are satisﬁable, from which we
can thus conclude Φ1 ∨ ... ∨ Φn ⊢c ⊥ and thus Φ ⊢c Ψ.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 8
To prove the three results, we show that for every minimally speciﬁc e-model π of KP
which satisﬁes
∧
a∈At N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)), it holds that the set M deﬁned
as follows is an answer set of P :
M = {l ∈ Lit | π |= N1(l)} (E.1)
and that all answer sets are of this form, i.e., that for every answer set M of P it holds
that the possibility distribution πM deﬁned as follows is a minimally speciﬁc e-model of KP
which satisﬁes
∧
a∈At N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)):
πM(ω) =
{
1 if ω |= l for every literal l ∈M
0 otherwise
• Let M be a consistent answer set of P . We show that πM is a minimally speciﬁc
e-model of KP which satisﬁes
∧
a∈HP
N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)). The latter
trivially follows from the fact that πM(ω) ∈ {0, 1} for each propositional interpretation
ω. It remains to be shown that πM is a minimally speciﬁc e-model of KP . Note that
because M is a consistent answer set, it holds that πM is normalized.
To see why πM is an e-model, consider a rule from P of the form (27) and assume
that πM satisﬁes N1(b1) ∧ ... ∧N1(bm) ∧Π1(¬c1) ∧ ... ∧Π1(¬cℓ). Since πM |= N1(bi),
we have πM(ω) = 0 for all worlds ω in which bi is false. By construction this means
that bi ∈ M . Similarly, since πM |= Π1(¬ci) there is at least one world ω in which ci
is false, which by construction means that ci /∈M .
It follows that the rule a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm is in the reduct P
M . Since M is a
model of this rule (given the assumption that M is an answer set), one of a1, ..., an is
in M . By construction this means that πM |= N1(ai) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
It remains to be shown that πM is minimally speciﬁc. Suppose π
∗ is an e-model of KP
which is strictly less speciﬁc than πM . Then there exists a world ω such that πM(ω) = 0
and π∗(ω) > 0. This means that there is a literal l∗ ∈ M such that π |= N1(l
∗) and
π∗ 6|= N1(l
∗). Let M∗ = {l | π∗ |= N1(l)}. It is clear that M
∗ ⊂ M . It is not hard to
see that M∗ is a model of PM , which is a contradiction since M is an answer set and
thus by deﬁnition the unique minimal model of PM .
• Let π be a minimally speciﬁc e-model of KP , which satisﬁes
∧
a∈At N1(a) ∨N1(¬a) ∨
(Π1(a) ∧Π1(¬a)). Let M be deﬁned as in (E.1). From the fact that π is normalized,
it immediately follows that M is consistent.
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First we show that M is a model of PM . Consider a rule of the form (27), for which
{c1, ..., cℓ} ∩ M = ∅, i.e., such that a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm is in the reduct
PM . Since ci /∈ M we know that π 6|= N1(ci). Because π by assumption satisﬁes
N1(ci) ∨N1(¬ci) ∨ (Π1(ci) ∧Π1(¬ci)) it follows that π |= N1(¬ci) or π |= Π1(¬ci).
Using axiom (D) we ﬁnd that π |= Π1(¬ci) for each ci. We then have that π is an
e-model of N1(a1)∨ ...∨N1(an)∨¬N1(b1)∨ ...∨¬N1(bm), from which we immediately
ﬁnd that M is a model of a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm.
Now suppose that M is not an answer set. Then the minimal model M∗ of PM is such
that M∗ ⊂M . The corresponding possibility distribution π∗ is deﬁned as
π∗(ω) =
{
1 if ω |= l for every literal l ∈M∗
0 otherwise
When π∗(ω) = 0, we have that ω |= ¬l for some l ∈ M∗. Then we also have l ∈ M
which means π |= N1(l) and in particular π(ω) = 0. It follows that π
∗ is less speciﬁc
than π, and since there is a literal l0 ∈M \M
∗ such that π |= N1(l0) and π
∗ 6|= N1(l0),
it follows that π∗ is strictly less speciﬁc than π.
Now we deﬁne a third possibility distribution π+ as follows:
π+(ω) =
{
1
2
if π(ω) = 0 and π∗(ω) = 1
π∗(ω) otherwise
Clearly, we have that π+ is strictly less speciﬁc than π. We show that π+ is an e-model
of KP , contradicting our assumption that π were a minimally speciﬁc e-model of KP ,
from which it then follows that M must be an answer set.
Consider a rule of the form (27). If {c1, ..., cℓ} ∩M 6= ∅, by construction π |= N1(ci)
must hold for some ci. This means π
+ |= N 1
2
(ci) and in particular π
+ |= ¬Π1(¬ci).
This means that π+ satisﬁes the corresponding GPL formula of the form (28). On the
other hand, if {c1, ..., cℓ}∩M = ∅, then M
∗ satisﬁes the rule a1∨ ...∨an ← b1∧ ...∧bm,
since this rule is in the reduct PM . Moreover, by construction we have l ∈ M∗
iﬀ π∗ |= N1(l) iﬀ π
+ |= N1(l). It follows that π
+ satisﬁes N1(a1) ∨ ... ∨ N1(an) ∨
¬N1(b1) ∨ ... ∨ ¬N1(bm).
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